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“The CEO prefaced the call by informing Cuban that he had
confidential information to convey . . . . Cuban became very upset and
angry during the conversation . . . . At the end of the call, Cuban told
the CEO ‘Well, now I’m screwed. I can’t sell.’”†
A joke in the private fund space: The holders will know who each other
are, who owns 2%. They’ll say “Wise guys! Let’s send this
[information] over to them!”‡
INTRODUCTION
Across legal domains—from commodities to securities, contracts to
property—we assume that everyone wants information. Yet, as Dallas
Mavericks owner Mark Cuban discovered, knowledge can be a curse.
American securities law prohibits trading on the basis of “inside
information,” such as an early tip about corporate strategy sure to presage a
swing in the stock price.1 Cuban became the subject of a nine-year-long
SEC insider trading enforcement action because of one such tip. He sold
his stake in Mamma.com soon after the CEO told him about a confidential
†
Complaint ¶ 14, SEC v. Cuban, No. 3:08-CV-02050-D, 2008 WL 4901149 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 16,
2013).
‡
Interview by Andrew Verstein with Anonymous Private Funds Attorney (Oct. 13, 2015).
1
See infra Part II (describing just what sorts of information are, and are not, subject to restrictions,
as well as what is meant by “on the basis of”). For more information on the various sorts of informed
trading, see generally Merritt B. Fox et al., The New Stock Market: Sense and Nonsense, 65 DUKE L.J.
191 (2015).
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plan to dilute the existing shareholders by issuing new shares. The sale may
have saved Cuban $750,000.2 But Cuban claimed that he had preexisting
plans to sell his shares and that he did not need or want additional reasons
to do so.3 The CEO’s tip put Cuban in a difficult position: either cancel the
planned sale or endure almost a decade of costly and risky litigation.
From the CEO’s perspective, discouraging Cuban’s sale was not a bad
thing. After all, Cuban was the company’s largest shareholder with 6.3% of
the stock.4 A sale by such a major investor would have sent shock waves
through the shares of the small company, frustrating the planned securities
offering. Relatedly, Cuban’s large stake might have been a sufficient
toehold for an activist investor to agitate for change at Mamma.com.
Cuban’s sale of shares endangered the managers’ plans and their jobs.
Thus the management of Mamma.com had several reasons to try to
keep Cuban from selling shares, and the discussion of confidential stock
offerings could have helped bind him in place. By tainting Cuban with
inside information, the managers heaped risk into Cuban’s exit path; more
prudent investors would have relented and retained their shares.
The Mark Cuban case offers a glimpse into the secretive world of
“insider tainting.” Whereas most informational tips open doors, insider
tainting closes doors. Rather than empowering and enriching the recipient,
the tipper conveys information precisely in order to constrain the tippee.
Tainted with inside information, the tippee faces legal risks to her
preexisting or potential trading plans. By leveraging high-stakes public law
to serve as a threat, insider tainting confers power over the trades of others.
It may seem surprising that tainting is possible. Criminal law is
supposed to punish only the culpable, and even civil offenses in the
securities world are supposed to require scienter (i.e., “intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud”5). Moreover, familiar features of insider trading
law would seem to protect innocent traders. It is usually lawful to trade on
a hot tip unless you assumed a duty of trust and confidence or unless your
source breaches such a duty by sharing the secret with you in order to
secure a personal (often pecuniary) benefit.6 Yet the victims of insider
2

Complaint, supra note †, ¶ 24.
Regardless of whether we believe Cuban’s version of the story, we should believe in traders like
Cuban. See Donald C. Langevoort, “Fine Distinctions” in the Contemporary Law of Insider Trading,
2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 429, 445–46 (discussing a hypothetical based on the Mark Cuban case).
4
Complaint, supra note †, ¶ 10.
5
See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976) (defining and requiring scienter in
Rule 10b-5 actions); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952) (“Crime, as a compound
concept, [is] generally constituted only from concurrence of an evil-meaning mind with an evil-doing
hand . . . .”).
6
See infra Part II.
3

727

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

tainting do not intend any wrongdoing, they do not promise confidentiality,
and their antagonists act out of spite rather than to some kind of quid pro
quo.
Nevertheless, insider tainting is viable. Some forms of insider trading
are illegal even if the trader assumed no duty, conferred no benefit, and
genuinely tried to avoid the tip.7 More importantly, insider trading cases are
characterized by expansive law and ambiguous facts, and so there are
numerous circumstances where traders may rationally fear that trading
could lead to trouble even when the law is on their side. Cuban escaped
liability by proving that he never promised confidentiality, but it took nine
years for him to establish his version of the facts, and he may only have
succeeded because the accusing CEO refused to testify against him.8 Even
where a clear-sighted court would acquit, tainting forces a trader to worry
that an aggressive plaintiff or prosecutor could pursue the case anyway.
Despite the secrecy associated with insider tainting, there is evidence
that tainting occurs.9 Tainting was deemed a serious enough problem that in
2014, Japan amended its securities laws to specifically account for
tainting.10 Securities attorneys report increasingly frequent questions from
clients about the proper handling of a juicy text message, call, or email—
sometimes anonymous and sometimes attributed to a competitor or issuer.11
In a world in which law is increasingly part of investment strategy,12 it
should come as no surprise that tainting is part of the arsenal of
sophisticated players.
This Article names, presents, and analyzes insider tainting for the first
time.13 It considers the contexts in which it can be deployed, techniques by
which it can be achieved, and the responses the law can use to limit it. It

7
Those privy to hostile takeover plans are generally forbidden from trading until the takeover
begins—even if they did not ask for such knowledge or restrictions. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (2017);
see also infra Section II.B. Providing certain traders with advance notice of a tender offer can place the
targeted traders on the sidelines.
8
Bradley J. Bondi, How Cuban Scored a Home Court Win Against the SEC, LAW360 (Nov. 14,
2013, 11:08 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/488308/how-cuban-scored-a-home-court-winagainst-the-sec [https://perma.cc/QR8Y-DGLK].
9
Cf. Alon Brav et. al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J.
FIN. 1729, 1757 (2008) (describing hedge fund tipping as “secretive” and challenging to substantiate).
10
See infra note 181 and accompanying text.
11
Several suggestive examples appear infra. See, e.g., infra note 131 and accompanying text
(describing plight of fund manager Leon Cooperman).
12
See, e.g., Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage and the Future of Public
Company M&A, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1551, 1567–72 (2015) (documenting the “renaissance” of hedge
funds investing to make use of the stockholder’s appraisal remedy).
13
Despite the depth of scholarship on insider trading, the literature has not yet taken stock of
insider tainting.
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shows that tainting is problematic: sometimes it operates as an antitakeover
defense, robbing shareholders of valuable payments and protecting
ineffective managers from the risk of replacement.14 In other cases, it helps
with takeovers by giving an unfair advantage to unscrupulous takeover
artists15 and by facilitating circumvention of shareholder-protective
disclosure requirements.16 This Article identifies features of the law that
help make tainting possible, such as the fact that traders can be convicted
for possessing certain information even if they do not set out to use it, and
it notes the many challenges to eliminating insider tainting.
This Article also uses insider tainting as an opportunity to reflect on
the law of securities in our society and the economics and regulation of
information generally. Insider tainting serves as a useful lens to reflect on
the vagueness and expansiveness that we have come to accept in insider
trading law17 and the chilling effect our law’s “fine distinctions” may have
on risk averse traders.
Apart from securities trading, insider tainting also informs our
understanding of private information in transactions generally and the
unintended effects of its regulation. Scholars focused on contracts and
insider trading have drawn on Anthony Kronman’s notion that the law can
require disclosure of casually acquired information without discouraging
production of deliberately acquired information.18 Insider tainting
underscores the instability of these informational categories; insider trading
law can lead some traders to deliberately avoid information.19
The structure of this Article is as follows. The first two Parts introduce
the relevant facts and law. Part I discusses three contexts in which
individuals might wish to disable the trades of another person—in which
insider tainting could come in handy if it were available. Managers might
like to block potential acquires, potential acquirers might like to stave off
competitors, and cooperating acquirers might like to prevent unauthorized
trades (purchases or sales) by members of their coalition. Readers who find
those propositions intuitive may save time by proceeding directly to Part II,
which reviews insider trading law. Readers familiar with this body of law
may skip or skim this Part without losing any important information.

14

See infra Section III.C.1.
See infra Section III.C.2.
16
See infra Section III.C.3.
17
See infra Section IV.B.
18
See generally Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of
Contracts, 7 J. LEG. STUD. 1 (1978).
19
See infra Section IV.B.2.
15
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Part III begins the main analytic contribution of the Article: it shows
that individuals can indeed use insider trading law to disable trades
unamicable to their interests. Part IV presents and evaluates potential
responses to insider tainting and then reflects on what insider tainting
teaches us about securities, corporate law, and information generally.
I.

CONTROLLING ANOTHER’S TRADES

Sometimes it would be nice to be able to veto another person’s trades.
This Part describes three contexts in which that is true in order to set the
stage for Part III, in which insider tainting is shown to be useful. All three
examples in this section concern mergers and acquisitions (M&A).20 The
three examples are takeover defenses, competitive bidding, and wolf pack
activism. To summarize briefly, managers would sometimes like to stop
acquirers, acquirers would sometimes like to stop other acquirers, and
cooperating investors would sometimes like to stop their compatriots from
trading in ways incompatible with their collective plans.
A. Takeover Defenses
Mergers and acquisitions are among the most momentous events in
the life of a corporation. They can generate and transfer billions of dollars.21
20
This focus on M&A is in part out of respect for the scale of the problem. The stakes are so high
in acquisitions as to tempt all manner of wrongful behavior. Indeed, that is why the SEC has
implemented a special insider trading regime just localized in the context of acquisitions. See infra
Section III.A.2. The focus on M&A is also justified for reasons of analytic focus and clarity—it is
sometimes better to take a deep dive into one topic rather than canvass all topics on the first look;
subsequent work can examine tainting in other contexts.
The focus on M&A should not be taken as a concession that these issues are limited to M&A.
Indeed, both quotations at the start of this Article refer to non-M&A cases of possible insider tainting.
The Mark Cuban quotation plausibly concerned efforts to protect the share price against Cuban’s
departure.
The second quotation concerned competition among market makers. Where only a few firms make
a market in a security, it is a joke among financial professionals that one market maker might taint
another in order to secure a temporary monopoly on the security. Disabling another trader could thus
create an anticompetitive and cartelizing influence in trading markets, even where no one has any
interest in acquiring control of portfolio companies.
21
E.g., Sydney Ember & Michael J. de la Merced, Sinclair Unveils Tribune Deal, Raising Worries
It Will Be Too Powerful, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/08/business/
media/sinclair-tribune-media-sale.html [https://perma.cc/8END-EN2D] (reporting a proposed $3.9
billion merger). There is widespread agreement that the target company shareholders usually gain
substantially due to mergers. Gregor Andrade et al., New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers, 15 J.
ECON. PERSP. 103, 103 (2001); Gregg A. Jarrell et al., The Market for Corporate Control: The
Empirical Evidence Since 1980, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 49, 49, 51 (1988). The scale of these gains can be
monumental: typical takeover premiums exceed 15–20%, instantly generating millions or billions in
value. See Andrade et al., supra, at 110. Acquirers, for their part, sometimes do very well too. See
Jarrell et al., supra, at 53. Takeover artists and serial acquirers, such as private equity firms, make
enough money from the periodic purchase and sale of firms to keep themselves in comfort. See Vipal
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One powerful rationale for corporate combinations is as a tool for
increasing efficiency by disciplining incompetent or self-serving
managers.22 When acquisitions take place, the target company’s existing
executives and board stand a good chance of losing their perch. Therefore,
managers face an existential threat from unwelcome acquirers and so have
a powerful interest in constraining the market for corporate control.
Considerable energy has therefore been devoted to protecting
incumbent managers from unwanted takeovers¾but only within certain
limits. For example, Delaware courts have vindicated the use of poison
pills, which are a legal tool that penalizes unwelcome acquirers.23
Monga, Serial Acquirers Benefit Most from M&A: McKinsey, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 23, 2012, 12:41 AM),
https://blogs.wsj.com/cfo/2012/01/23/serial-acquirers-benefit-most-from-ma-mckinsey
[https://perma.cc/BUK2-PKKU] (“Companies that had regular M&A programs that represented 19% or
more of their market capitalization performed better on average than those relying on organic growth or
large-scale M&A.”); see also Benn Protess & Michael Corkery, Just How Much Do the Top Private
Equity Earners Make?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/10/business/
dealbook/just-how-much-do-the-top-private-equity-earners-make.html [https://perma.cc/6BCL-GJRD]
(discussing the high compensation of private equity managers).
22
See Michael C. Jensen, Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 21, 22
(1988); Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 112–
13 (1965). This can be true even in cases where the acquisition does not occur. The threat of a takeover
disciplines managers. Anup Agrawal & Jeffrey F. Jaffe, Do Takeover Targets Underperform? Evidence
from Operating and Stock Returns, 38 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 721, 744 (2003).
Numerous other motivations can drive one company to acquire another. Optimally,
corporate
combinations create synergistic links between complementary assets. See Elazar Berkovitch & M.P.
Narayanan, Motives for Takeovers: An Empirical Investigation, 28 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS,
347, 347 (1993).
Some acquisitions may constitute or aggravate agency costs, as managers seek to draw greater
perquisites from a larger corporate empire. See Yakov Amihud & Baruch Lev, Risk Reduction as a
Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers, 12 BELL J. ECON. 605, 605–07 (1981) (identifying riskmuting diversification as a managerial motive for expansion); Richard Roll, The Hubris Hypothesis of
Corporate Takeovers, 59 J. BUS. 197, 197, 212 (1986) (arguing that managers overestimate their ability
to run diversified firms). But see Sanjai Bhagat et al., Hostile Takeovers in the 1980s: The Return to
Corporate Specialization, 1990 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 1, 2
(finding a tendency to use acquisitions to increase specialization rather than diversification).
Acquisitions can serve as a pretext for breaching implicit contracts with nonshareholder constituents,
such as workers and bondholders. Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile
Takeovers, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33, 34 (Alan J. Auerbach ed.,
1988). But see Bhagat et al., supra, at 19–34 (arguing that blue-collar workers do not tend to lose jobs
after acquisitions); Jarrell et al, supra note 21, at 56–57 (discussing contrary evidence). Combinations
can increase market power and reduce competition. See, e.g., George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly,
72 J. POL. ECON. 44, 45 (1964) (describing mergers as “the most comprehensive” form of collusion).
But see B. Espen Eckbo, Horizontal Mergers, Collusion, and Stockholder Wealth, 11 J. FIN. ECON 241,
242 (1983) (rejecting this hypothesis after reviewing merger data).
23
The simplest variant of the poison pill distributes to shareholders a large number of warrants—
essentially, stock options—exercisable only if some arriviste acquires a controlling block. The diluting
effect of these warrants, enriching all existing shareholders at the expense of the acquirer, greatly
discourages acquisition efforts. Another technique for protecting manager incumbency is the use of
classified or staggered boards, which have been a flashpoint for controversy for most of the twentieth
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Delaware courts have blessed poison pills on the theory that managers
may need some leverage in order to negotiate with acquirers to secure a
better deal for shareholders than they would have gotten from a unilateral
ultimatum.24 But there are limits on judicial acceptance of defensive
techniques.
Any defensive technique must respond to an objectively reasonable
belief about a threat to corporate policy and effectiveness.25 Defenses must
be reasonable in relation to the threat.26 Therefore, a poison pill cannot
itself be preclusive or coercive.27 The board must meet similar standards
whenever a shareholder requests a waiver of part of an existing poison
pill.28 Whatever defensive technique is adopted, boards must disclose the
defensive device and the motives for its adoption.29 Above all, the poison
century. Classified boards typically cycle their membership only every three years, preserving board
continuity but also significantly slowing any effort to clean house. Compare Lucian Bebchuk et al.,
What Matters in Corporate Governance?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 783, 791 (2009) (discussing evidence
that classification reduces firm value), with K. J. Martijn Cremers et al., Staggered Boards and LongTerm Firm Value, Revisited, 126 J. FIN. ECON. 422, 423–24 (2017) (finding no evidence that
classification reduces firm value). For a recent case vindicating the use of classified boards alongside
poison pills, see Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48 (Del. Ch. 2011).
24
See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 175–76, 180 (Del.
1986) (recognizing that a poison pill was lawful under a Delaware statute); Moran v. Household Int’l,
Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1357 (Del. 1985) (upholding a modern poison pill); Goggin v. Vermillion, Inc.,
No. 6465-VCN, 2011 WL 2347704, at *5 (Del. Ch. June 3, 2011) (“Delaware courts have repeatedly
approved of the adoption of a rights plan.”).
25
See Unocal Corp v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (noting that “a
defensive measure to thwart or impede a takeover [must be] motivated by a good faith concern for the
welfare of the corporation and its stockholders”).
26
See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 181; Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
27
Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1378 (Del. 1995) (“[T]his Court has
recognized . . . the unreasonableness and non-proportionality of responding defensively to a takeover
bid with a coercive and preclusive partial self-tender offer.”).
28
Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, C.A. No. 9469-VCP, 2014 WL 1922029, at *21 (Del. Ch. May 2,
2014) (holding that plaintiffs did not establish likely success on the merits that the board breached its
fiduciary duty by failing to waive the 10% poison pill threshold, which would have let the shareholder
buy up to 20% of the firm).
29
See Red Oak Fund, L.P. v. Digirad Corp., C.A. No. 8559-VCN, 2013 WL 5740103, at *12 (Del.
Ch. Oct. 23, 2013) (recognizing a duty to disclose relevant information in a proxy contest context, but
finding no breach in the instant case because there were no conclusive poison pill plans to disclose at
the time of the challenged vote). But see Lewis v. Chrysler Corp., 949 F.2d 644, 651 (3d Cir. 1991)
(holding that Chrysler’s failure to disclose that the poison pill might be used to maintain manager
control was not an actionable omission because investors are charged with the knowledge of “the
‘universal’ interest of corporate officers and directors in maintaining corporate control” (quoting
Warner Commc’ns Inc. v. Murdoch, 581 F. Supp. 1482, 1492 (D. Del. 1984))).
Failure to disclose poison pill information could also expose the adopting firm to liability under
federal securities laws, namely Section 14(e) of the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. §78n.(e) (2012), which
forbids fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts, including misleading omissions in connection with
tender offers. See infra note 163 and accompanying text. Some scholars have identified disclosure as
crucial in protecting poison pills from being characterized as manipulative or deceptive. See, e.g.,
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pill may never be used primarily to entrench existing managers and prevent
shareholders from having electoral control over the corporation—even if
they might use that control to elect new and potentially inferior directors.30
These constraints are meaningful. Plaintiffs routinely challenge board
actions as unreasonable or disproportionate, and courts entertain these
challenges. For example, the pharmaceutical company Allergan adopted a
“pretty customary” poison pill in response to takeover efforts by rival
Valeant and its ally, activist hedge fund Pershing Square.31 Although the
plaintiffs conceded that the pill was “very customary,”32 the court
nevertheless determined that it gave rise to a colorable claim and the
possibility of irreparable injury.33 That is because even a customary pill
could illegally frustrate the shareholders’ franchise rights in conjunction
with other facts.34
Therefore, the court granted the plaintiff’s motion for expedition. The
case settled before the court could give its final word on the poison pill,35
but the litigation constituted an important reminder that the law imposes
meaningful constraints on takeover defenses.
And legal constraints are not the only constraints. Institutional
investors and proxy advisors are wary of supporting firms with robust
poison pills.36
Note, Protecting Shareholders Against Partial and Two-Tiered Takeovers: The “Poison Pill”
Preferred, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1964, 1980 (1984); cf. Martin M. Cohen, “Poison Pills” as a Negotiating
Tool: Seeking a Cease-Fire in the Corporate Takeover Wars, 1987 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 459, 505
(stating that poison pill plans provide shareholders with a “plethora of information” rather than deceive
them).
30
See eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 29–30 (Del. Ch. 2010) (nothing that
“like any strong medicine, however, a pill can be misused,” and that “a rights plan can be deployed
inappropriately to benefit incumbent managers and directors”); Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp.,
564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988) (disfavoring poison pills “designed for the primary purpose of
interfering with the effectiveness of a stockholder vote”).
31
Transcript of Oral Argument on Plaintiff’s Motion for Expedited Proceedings and Rulings of the
Court at 5, PS Fund 1, LLC v. Allergan, Inc., No. 9760-CB (Del. Ch. dismissed June 28, 2014).
32
Id. at 55.
33
Id. at 58.
34
Id. at 56. In this case, the additional facts included a preexisting bylaw that permitted
shareholders to call a special meeting only if requested by 25% of the investor polity. See id. at 5–7.
The court was unwilling to preemptively bless a customary pill when combined with a peculiar bylaw.
35
Phil Milford & Drew Armstrong, Allergan Poison Pill Won’t Be Triggered by Pershing Call,
BLOOMBERG (June 27, 2014, 5:27 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-0627/allergan-settles-pershing-square-suit-over-poison-pill [https://perma.cc/NFF5-X66V].
36
ISS and Glass Lewis both recommend voting against firms with poison pills of longer than a
one-year duration. They both urge case-by-case consideration of firms with shorter term poison pills.
See SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP, SIDLEY UPDATE: ISS AND GLASS LEWIS POLICY UPDATES FOR THE 2017
PROXY SEASON (2016), https://www.sidley.com/~/media/update-pdfs/2016/11/iss-and-glass-lewispolicy-updates-for-the-2017-proxy-season.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XNX-YM3G].
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In summary, managers often wish to halt would-be acquirers, yet
defensive tactics are constrained by both law and investor expectations. In
light of this unmet demand for defensive capacity, it will later prove
unsurprising if managers find other springs at which to slake their thirst.
B. Bidding Wars
It is not only managers who sometimes want to stop an unwanted
bidder. Because competitive auctions channel value to the seller,37 it would
be far better for a would-be acquirer to be the only would-be acquirer.
Consider the raucous bidding war depicted in the book and film
Barbarians at the Gate.38 RJR Nabisco’s market capitalization stood at
about $12.5 billion before one of Wall Street’s biggest firms offered to buy
it out. Other bidders soon followed. This tug-of-war drove the purchase
price to $25 billion and saddled the “victor” with a crushing debt
obligation—the ultimate winner’s curse.39 How much nicer it would have
been if the first bidder had been able to disable the second bidder at the
start. Perhaps the deal could have been consummated quietly and quickly
before egos were enflamed and wallets opened.
Bidders already expend considerable energy to reduce competition in
a potential acquisition,40 but they are subject to a number of legal
constraints. The Williams Act imposes myriad protections for target
company shareholders, which make it easier for competitor bidders to come
into the fold. For example, acquirers must disclose their presence and
intentions within ten days of acquiring 5% of the target company.41 Tender
offerors must disclose their conflicts of interest.42 They must hold offers
37
See Kenneth R. French & Robert E. McCormick, Sealed Bids, Sunk Costs, and the Process of
Competition, 57 J. BUS. 417, 423–24 (1984).
38
See BRYAN BURROUGH AND & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE: THE FALL OF RJR
NABISCO (1990); Barbarians at the Gate (HBO 1993).
39
See generally Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Winner’s Curse, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 191 (1988)
(describing the general phenomenon of auction winners bidding too much).
40
Bidders keep their acquisition plans secret, and they may condition their bids upon promises by
the target not to seek other bids, not to cooperate with other bidders, or simply to decide quickly enough
that other bids are unlikely. These deal-protection efforts have spurred considerable academic debate.
See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers: A Reply and
Extension, 35 STAN. L. REV. 23 (1982); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of
a Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981); Ronald J.
Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defense, 35 STAN. L. REV. 51
(1982).
41
See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2012) (requiring 5% owners to comply with SEC filing requirements);
17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (2017) (requiring filing from 5% owners); id. § 240.13d-101 (stipulating content
of filing).
42
Tender Offers, Securities Act Release No. 6,158, Exchange Act Release No. 16,384, 44 Fed.
Reg. 70,326 (Dec. 6, 1979) (describing the requirements of Item 3(b) on Schedule 14D-9).
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open for at least twenty business days,43 accept tendered shares on a pro
rata basis,44 and otherwise abjure discriminatory tender offers.45 State
antitakeover laws impose similar requirements and restrictions.46
These legal restrictions impair bidders’ abilities to bid without
competition. Given the potential costs entailed by bidding wars, bidders are
likely to think of every possible way to avoid serious competition. We shall
see later that insider trading law can play a role in thwarting competing
bidders.
C. Wolf Packs
It is not just longtime antagonists, such as intransigent managers and
competitor bidders, who may wish to block the trading of another. Some
would-be cooperators could use trading restrictions to buttress their
coordination efforts. One context where this dynamic is true is among
coordinated activist investors, often called “wolf packs,” in which
cooperation is valued but unstable.
Activist investors take a stake in a target company in order to exert
influence on management, with an eye to increasing share prices. A wolf
pack is “a loose network of activist investors that act in a parallel fashion
but deliberately” try to avoid triggering certain filing obligations.47
Activists work together to disperse the risks and challenges which
would concentrate on a single activist acting alone. If a dozen like-minded
hedge funds each take a 4% stake in a company, their collective influence
will be irresistible, but no individual fund needs to accept all the economic
risks of a controlling stake.
Working together also helps each firm stay below the threshold for
ownership-triggered legal effects. Poison pills, or rights offerings, and
similar defensive tactics typically activate or become available against
owners of 10% of a company’s stock.48 A stake of 10% of a target
company’s stock will designate the investor an “insider” for the purposes of
43

17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1(a).
Id. § 240.14d-8. Non-pro rata acceptance might be deemed coercive, insofar as early tenderers
might receive better treatment than later tenderers.
45
Id. §§ 240.13e-4, 240.14d-10; Amendments to Tender Offer Rules: All-Holders and Best-Price,
Exchange Act Release No. 23,421, 51 Fed. Reg. 25,873 (July 17, 1986).
46
See generally Michal Barzuza, The State of State Antitakeover Law, 95 V A. L. REV. 1973 (2009)
(surveying characteristics of state antitakeover laws).
47
John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism
on Corporate Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 545, 562 (2016). The filing obligations are those owed by
“groups” under § 13(d)(3) of the Exchange Act of 1934. See infra notes 49–52 and accompanying text.
48
See, e.g., Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, C.A. No. 9469-VCP, 2014 WL 1922029, at *26 (Del.
Ch. May 2, 2014) (declining to enjoin a pill with a 10% threshold for active acquirers).
44
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Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.49 Section 16 insiders
must disgorge any “short-swing” profits, which include gains made from
selling stock purchased within the last six months.50 Even lower, at 5%, the
Williams Act requires large shareholders to report their position.51
Splitting up the activist campaign among several funds lets many
hover below a given ownership threshold and potentially avoid the
associated consequences. This “divide and conquer” solution is the central
benefit of wolf packs, which Coffee and Palia identify as “a leading cause
of increased hedge fund activism” in recent days.52
Though wolf packs solve economic and legal problems for activists,
such arrangements present their own challenges. If the hedge funds
coordinate too closely, they can be deemed a “group” for the purposes of
federal securities laws,53 which would undermine many of the benefits that
led to the use of a wolf pack.54 Avoiding this problem requires funds to
maintain a large degree of independence. This independence leads to
instability: members of the wolf pack will work together as long as it is in
their individual best interests, but they may not support the group goal if it
becomes more advantageous to defect from it.
Indeed, activists may opportunistically abandon their joint effort.55
Although the disclosure of activist involvement usually raises stock
prices,56 the success of a campaign is never assured, and failed campaigns
may result in a lower stock price.57 The result can be a sort of prisoner’s
dilemma, with some funds tempted to sell soon after announcement so as to

49

See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (2012).
See id. § 78p(b); see also Ellen Taylor, Teaching an Old Law New Tricks: Rethinking Section 16,
39 ARIZ. L. REV. 1315, 1323–24 (1997) (arguing that Section 16(b) is overinclusive).
51
15 U.S.C. § 78m(d). The public filing of one’s position has a number of negative consequences.
It alerts all other investors to your plans, so it may be hard to acquire any more shares at a reasonable
price. It also notifies management, which may initiate defensive tactics such as implementing a poison
pill if they have not already.
52
Coffee & Palia, supra note 47, at 550.
53
15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(3) (“When two or more persons act as a . . . group for the purpose of
acquiring, holding, or disposing of securities of an issuer, such syndicate or group shall be deemed a
‘person’ for the purposes of this subsection.”).
54
See Coffee, & Palia, supra note 47, at 562–64 (explaining the tactical benefits that turn on not
being a “group”).
55
See id. at 567 (“[S]ome members may drop out well before the proxy contest is begun or comes
to a vote. Most do not appear to hold for the long run.”).
56
See Brav et al., supra note 9, at 1730.
57
Leslie Picker, Billionaire Investor Nelson Peltz Sells Stake in PepsiCo, N.Y. TIMES (May 13,
2016), https://nyti.ms/24QZ8ya [https://perma.cc/C3VJ-8EFL] (“The news of [the activist’s] exit
contributed to a slight decline in Pepsi’s stock price, which slipped 1.8 percent on Friday, to $104.18.”).
50
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lock in their gains so far.58 The more funds that take this approach, the less
likely the activist campaign is to succeed, as once-allied voters run for the
door. This can become a self-fulfilling cycle as funds fear being the last
one out the door. A viable and collectively rational campaign can collapse
under the weight of individual defection.
Defection can occur even before the campaign is actually begun.59 A
fund may feign interest in the activist campaign in order to encourage its
formation but spend the accumulation period selling shares rather than
buying them. Consider an example of such a betrayal, perpetrated by one of
Japan’s first activist investors, Yoshiaki Murakami.60
A former Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry official,
Murakami made his name by launching Japan’s first postwar tender offer.61
Then in 2003, he set his sights on Nippon Broadcasting System (NBS),
buying up 18% of the company’s shares and applying increasing public
pressure for a change in management. As the months went on, Murakami
sought an ally in his campaign. He found one in Takafumi Horie, another
larger-than-life figure. 62
Murakami and Horie met to discuss a coordinated assault on NBS’s
defenses. If Horie could acquire 33% of the NBS stock, they would jointly
58
See Coffee & Palia, supra note 47, at 593 (describing the potential for “relatively riskless profit”
if a group member defects early).
59
Another form of early defection is to simply steal the idea. A well-known activist’s indication
that a company is ripe for influence can serve as an important signal to other hedge funds. Those most
critical of activists tend to suggest that activists have a knack for picking underperforming companies,
for whom reversion to the mean may be imminent. See Martijn Cremers et al., Hedge Fund Activism
and
Long-Term
Firm
Value
6
(Nov.
19,
2015)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2693231 [https://perma.cc/J2VN-H8KG] (“[H]edge funds seem to primarily
target relatively undervalued firms.”). For a twist on this, consider the facts of the RJR Nabisco bidding
war. See supra text accompanying notes 40–41. There, the management group met with KKR to discuss
a tender offer but then withdrew to work with American Express. We can style KKR as a competing
group, or we could conceive of the managers themselves as a competing group, withdrawing from and
competing with the group they themselves founded with KKR. Regardless, the saga left numerous
feelings hurt because its participants felt that they had been victims of defection at various stages.
60
For more information about these events, see generally Stephen Givens, Looking Through the
Wrong End of the Telescope: The Japanese Judicial Response to Steel Partners, Murakami, and Horie,
88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1571 (2011).
61
See ENRICO COLCERA, THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL IN JAPAN 110 (2007).
Interestingly, METI was the government agency that, at the time of the Murakami’s violation, was
helping to draft authorized poison pills for the first time under Japanese law. CORP. VALUE STUDY
GRP., CORPORATE VALUE REPORT (2006), http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/economy/keiei_innovation/
keizaihousei/pdf/houkoku06_eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/BB2J-LAHM].
62
Although Horie would later be jailed for securities fraud, in 2005 he was a big-spending internet
tycoon and a serial acquirer of stodgy but hitherto respectable companies. See Justin McCurry,
Japanese Internet Tycoon Guilty of Securities Fraud, GUARDIAN (Mar. 16, 2007, 10:06 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2007/mar/16/japan.internationalnews [https://perma.cc/SAR537HT].
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control the company—provided that Murakami retained his block. Would
he do so? “I can’t promise anything, but trust me.”63 This hedged response
foreshadowed Murakami’s later faithlessness but was enough for Horie to
indicate that he was “definitely interested” and would seek appropriate
financing for his buying spree.64
Horie spent the next three months buying NBS shares—35%, in
total—before he announced his triumphant achievement.65 However,
Murakami had not followed through on his end. Instead of holding his
shares and assuring the coalition a controlling stake, Murakami had
betrayed his partner by discretely selling his shares. In fact, Horie had
basically bought up Murakami’s shares. The activist campaign would
therefore fail, and Horie would be left holding the bag,66 enabling
Murakami to discreetly liquidate a vast position that might have otherwise
been difficult to liquidate.
In light of these events, the future Hories of the world may be more
skeptical about putatively coordinated efforts, just as the future Murakamis
must work hard to build trust. Each would be pleased to discover some
credible commitment device for blocking unauthorized trades. We shall see
that insider trading law can serve to make tacit cooperation credible.
*

*

*

The examples above give ample evidence that the power to veto the
trades of another would carry substantial value. But can it be
accomplished? Most traders would not voluntarily submit themselves to the
veto of a competitor or antagonist. Those who might accept such a yoke
will not necessarily find the law supportive of the arrangement. Yet there is
a body of law that constrains trading: the securities laws concerning insider
trading. It is to that body of law that we now turn.

63
See Givens, supra note 60, at 1596 (quoting Tōkyō Chihō Saibansho [Tōkyō Dist. Ct.] July 19,
2007
(Japan)
(unpublished),
https://www.westlawjapan.com/case_law/pdf/WLJP_10-012008_04_22.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZJJ9-SJ52]).
64
See id.
65
See id. at 1578.
66
The campaign’s failure had other causes. It is also the first one in which a poison pill was
permitted by Japanese courts—two months before publication of the government’s official report
urging their permissibility. See id. at 1579.
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II. THE LAW PREVENTING INSIDER TRADING
Dozens of traders each year are investigated for trading on the basis of
proscribed information,67 resulting in dozens of civil enforcement actions.68
Since 2009, more than eighty traders have been criminally convicted by
federal prosecutors in Manhattan alone.69
While the United States certainly regulates informed trading, you
might not know it just by reading primary legal texts such as codified
criminal law. No statute or rule defines “insider trading.”70 Until thirty
years ago, the words insider trading appeared in no statute71 and was not a
government enforcement priority.72 It has been said that there simply was
no legal or moral proscription of informed trading until the SEC conjured
one in the early 1960s.73
Regardless, a federal common law of insider trading has rapidly
developed in recent decades,74 interpreting and extending Rule 10b-5 and
67

See Nate Raymond, FBI Says Conducting 30 Undisclosed Insider Trading Probes, REUTERS
(July 5, 2016, 2:30 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-insidertrading-idUSKCN0ZL2G4
[https://perma.cc/EC5S-ACDY] (stating that the FBI has more than fifty ongoing insider trading
investigations in New York City alone).
68
See U.S. SEC, SELECT SEC AND MARKET DATA: FISCAL 2014, at 3 (2014),
https://www.sec.gov/about/secstats2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/DAY3-8N6Y] (reporting fifty-two civil
and administrative insider trading actions in 2014). See generally Urska Velikonja, Reporting Agency
Performance: Behind the SEC’s Enforcement Statistics, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 927–28 (2016)
(discussing the quality and provenance of SEC statistics).
69
Raymond, supra note 67.
70
Several efforts to define the act were introduced in recent years, but none received substantial
support. E.g., Stop Illegal Insider Trading Act, S. 702, 114th Cong. (2015); Ban Insider Trading Act of
2015, H.R. 1173, 114th Cong. (2015); Insider Trading Prohibition Act, H.R. 1625, 114th Cong. (2015).
71
See Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704,
102 Stat. 4677 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). The only prior statutory provision
addressing something like insider trading actually targeted conduct bearing no resemblance to the
practices we now debate: Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 penalizes rapid trading
by certain officers and directors of public companies, regardless of whether they have any special
information. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2012).
72
See Stephen J. Crimmins, Insider Trading: Where Is the Line?, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 330,
349 (“From the SEC’s founding in 1934 to Chairman Cary’s groundbreaking 1961 decision in Cady,
Roberts—a span of twenty-seven years—the SEC brought no insider trading cases at all. Over the
subsequent twenty years, insider trading continued to be a relatively low prosecution priority in terms of
the number of cases at the agency . . . .”).
73
See HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 1 (1966) (“Prior to the year
1910 no one had ever publicly questioned the morality of corporate officers, directors, and employees
trading in the shares of corporations.”). But see Michael A. Perino, The Lost History of Insider Trading
51 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Northwestern University Law Review) (arguing that
insider trading in turn-of-the-century stock markets was not universally accepted and that its propriety
was challenged at some publicly traded companies).
74
See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 34-6668, 40 S.E.C. 907, 1961 WL
60638 (Nov. 8, 1961) (adjudicating for the first time a claim for trading with an unfair informational
advantage).
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Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,75 and it this federal
common law that most discussions of insider trading concern.76 Sprouting
for the most part from a fraud statute, sometimes enriched by state
fiduciary law, American insider trading law is deeply a product of its
terroir.
A. Fraud Theories
Two types of informed trading are prohibited on the theory that they
amount to fraud.77

75

Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act (as amended) provides (in pertinent part):
It shall be unlawful . . .
....
[t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as
the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012). Pursuant to the grant of authority contained in Section 10(b), the SEC
promulgated Rule 10b-5, which provides:
It shall be unlawful . . .
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate
as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2017). See generally Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN L. REV. 385 (1990).
76
Some theory or another is necessary because the operative rule for prosecuting most insider
trading is Rule 10b-5, an antifraud rule. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234–35 (1980)
(“Section 10(b) is aptly described as a catchall provision, but what it catches must be fraud. When an
allegation of fraud is based upon nondisclosure, there can be no fraud absent a duty to speak.”). At
common law, it is not fraud to remain silent about one’s knowledge unless one is under an affirmative
duty to speak. Id. at 227–28 (stating that such an affirmative duty has been traditionally imposed on
corporate insiders). The typical securities trader is silent when executing a trade through a broker or
anonymous stock exchange, so there can be no fraud unless the trader is under a duty to speak.
The two insider trading theories (classical and misappropriation), discussed infra, are accounts of
why a duty to speak might arise in connection with a given securities transaction. These theories are
independently sufficient grounds for liability, covering slightly different facts. See Steginsky v. Xcelera
Inc., 741 F.3d 365, 371 (2d Cir. 2014) (“[W]e hold that the fiduciary-like duty against insider trading
under section 10(b) is imposed and defined by federal common law . . . .”); see also A.C. Pritchard,
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and the Counterrevolution in the Federal Securities Laws, 52 DUKE L.J.
841, 930 (2003) (“Powell saw Rule 10b-5’s jurisprudence as a species of ‘federal common law.’”).
While most litigation and enforcement, and most of this Article, are focused on Rule 10b-5, insider
trading can also be pursued under federal mail and wire fraud statutes. See generally William K.S.
Wang, Application of the Federal Mail and Wire Fraud Statutes to Criminal Liability for Stock Market
Insider Trading and Tipping, 70 U. MIAMI L. REV. 220 (2015).
77
Cf. Zachary J. Gubler, A Unified Theory of Insider Trading Law, 105 GEO L.J. 1225, 1254–55
(2017) (explaining that courts may not inquire into one theory if the other theory better fits the facts).
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The Classical Theory bars insider trading as an abuse of some special
relationship that may exist between two traders, which would entitle one to
full disclosure by the other before consummating a trade.78 Most crucially,
the Supreme Court has held that “a relationship of trust and confidence
[exists] between the shareholders of a corporation and those insiders who
have obtained confidential information by reason of their position with that
corporation.”79 Hence, certain officers and directors commit a fraud by
engaging in insider trading because they remain silent while transacting
with individuals (existing and would-be shareholders) to whom they owe
candor as a result of the principal-agent relationship that gave rise to the
information in the first place.80
The Misappropriation Theory “holds that a person commits fraud ‘in
connection with’ a securities transaction, and thereby violates § 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5, when he misappropriates confidential information for
This suggests that these theories are not completely independent bases for liability. One theory may
succeed or fail in part because of the success or failure of another theory.
78
See e.g., Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228 (noting that a duty to disclose arises when the parties to the
trade have a fiduciary relationship or other “relation of trust and confidence” (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1976))). The status of such a duty prior to Chiarella is contested.
Some state courts had found such a duty as a matter of corporate law. See, e.g., Strong v. Repide,
213 U.S. 419, 431 (1909) (surveying various state supreme court cases related to a director’s duty to
disclose). And some federal courts had found such a duty as a matter of the law of fraud. See, e.g.,
Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 733 (8th Cir. 1967); Royal Air Props., Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210, 212
(9th Cir. 1962); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del. 1951); Kardon v. Nat’l
Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 800 (E.D. Pa. 1947). However, such outcomes were not universal, and
generally operated only when the transaction was face-to-face or otherwise personal. See Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Incorporating State Law Fiduciary Duties into the Federal Insider Trading Prohibition,
52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1189, 1220 (1995) (noting that while some courts rejected any fiduciary duty
for corporate officers and directors, most courts trended toward a special-circumstances rule or a
fiduciary rule). Courts have sometimes accepted that impersonal insider trading is a breach of the duty
of loyalty for the purposes of state corporate law. See, e.g., Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co., 70 A.2d 5, 7–8
(Del. Ch. 1949); accord Kahn v. Kolberg Kravis Roberts & Co., L.P., 23 A.3d 831, 838 (Del. 2011); In
re Primedia, Inc. Shareholders Litig., 67 A.3d 455, 479–80 (Del. Ch. 2013).
79
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228. For further discussion of the classical theory, see WANG &
STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING: LIABILITY AND COMPLIANCE §§ 5.02-03 (3d ed. 2013).
80
One’s status as a government official may give rise to similar duties. It appears that members of
Congress and their staff have done extremely well in the stock market. Alan J. Ziobrowski et al.,
Abnormal Returns from the Common Stock Investments of Members of the U.S. House of
Representatives, 13 BUS. & POL. 1 (2011) (documenting significant abnormal returns for stock market
trades of members of Congress). An outcry followed news reports that the laws did not bar insider
trading by members of Congress. The result was the 2012 STOCK Act, which prohibited many kinds of
insider trading by Congressmen and their staffs. STOCK Act, Pub. L. No. 112-105, 126 Stat. 291
(2012) (codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C.). Other governmental (and
pseudogovernmental) actors have been subject to explicit restrictions for a longer time. E.g., 7 U.S.C.
§ 13(c) (2012) (barring insider trading by members of the CFTC and their staff). But see Donna M.
Nagy, Insider Trading, Congressional Officials, and Duties of Entrustment, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1105, 1111
(2011) (arguing that governmental insider trading was always illegal under Rule 10b-5, at least to
whatever degree nongovernmental insider trading was illegal).
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securities trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the source of the
information.”81 The Supreme Court recognized the misappropriation theory
in O’Hagan, in which a lawyer bought shares in a company because he
knew that the company would soon be acquired (by one of the law firm’s
clients).82 Under the classical theory, O’Hagan would not have been barred
from trading; he was no fiduciary of the shareholders of the target
company. However, he must have misrepresented his intentions, feigning
loyalty, in order to gain his firm’s trust in order to get this information. In
Justice Ginsburg’s words, “a fiduciary’s undisclosed, self-serving use of a
principal’s information to purchase and sell securities, in breach of a duty
of loyalty and confidentiality, defrauds the principal of the exclusive use of
that information.”83
Both fraud-based theories of insider trading cast a pall over trading by
certain insiders as well as those whom they tip. A trader cannot escape
liability simply because she herself is not an executive at the issuer
company (though her information source is) and she did not personally
misappropriate the information (if her source misappropriated it). Rather,
the law allows for tippee liability on a derivative basis. If the tippee knows
or should know that the tip was acquired or shared in violation of a duty,
then the tippee can be liable for insider trading.84 This is most evident when
the source of information gets a personal benefit, often pecuniary, from
informing the tippee.85 It is not essential that the tippee have anything to do
with the misappropriation so long as she is on notice of it.86
81
United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997). For discussion of the misappropriation
theory, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 79, § 5.04.
82
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 648.
83
Id. at 652. The SEC has promulgated a list of relationships that can establish a duty of trust and
confidence. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2017). Importantly, a duty is present if “the person communicating
the material nonpublic information and the person to whom it is communicated have a history, pattern,
or practice of sharing confidences.” Id. § 240.10b5–2(b)(2). For example, one trader was sanctioned for
trading on a secret he learned at an Alcoholics Anonymous meeting. SEC v. McGee, 895 F. Supp. 2d
669, 682 (E.D. Pa. 2012), aff’d, United States v. McGee, 763 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2014).
84
When the source breaches a duty in acquiring or sharing the information, the tippee can be a
“participa[nt] after the fact.” WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 79, § 5.03[1]. When the tipper does not
violate the law in acquiring the information or in tipping it, the tippee may be a primary violator by
breaching her duty of trust and confidence to the source. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983)
(“[A] tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation not to trade on material nonpublic information only when the insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by
disclosing the information to the tippee and the tippee knows or should know that there has been a
breach.”).
85
See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663. The recent Salman decision affirmed Dirks in almost all respects. In
particular, Salman did not require a pecuniary benefit to the tipper. Instead, a chain of tippees can be
implicated if the tipper simply sought to confer a gift on a “trading relative or friend.” Salman v. United
States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 427–28 (2016) (quoting Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664). The decision seems to have
done little to change insider trading law, other than to undo part of what the earlier Newman case had
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It is a fraud to trade “on the basis” of proscribed information, but what
is “on the basis”?87 Is trading barred only if the trader used the information,
somehow changing her conduct in light of the information? Or is a trader
culpable even if she would have made the same trade regardless, her only
offense being that she traded while knowing a secret? In other words, need
there be a causal connection between the trade and the trader’s knowledge
of proscribed information?
This question has come to be known as the “causation” standard, and
it has occasioned substantial debate. Several circuits embraced a
prodefendant “use” standard, in which traders could lawfully go about their
business, even if they happened to obtain proscribed information, so long
as it did not actually cause them to trade any differently.88 Other circuits
adopted a mere “knowledge” standard.89 On this standard, it does not matter
done to bolster the protection of the personal benefit test. See United States v. Martoma, 869 F.3d 58,
67 (2d. Cir. 2017) (eliminating Newman’s requirement that the tipper has a “meaningfully close
personal relationship” with the tippee friend or relative (quoting United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d
438, 452 (2d Cir. 2014))).
Still, by cleaving to Dirks, Salman may worry critics about the boundaries of the gift-based
prohibition. These boundaries may appear vague—how close a friend is a “friend”?—or expansive. Cf.
Newman, 773 F.3d at 452 (“[The personal benefit standard] does not suggest that the Government may
prove the receipt of a personal benefit by the mere fact of a friendship, particularly of a casual or social
nature. If that were true, and the Government was allowed to meet its burden by proving that two
individuals were alumni of the same school or attended the same church, the personal benefit
requirement would be a nullity.”). On the personal benefit test in the misappropriation context, see
generally Merritt B. Fox & George Tepe, Insider Trading: Personal Benefit Has No Place in
Misappropriation
Tipping
Cases,
CLS
BLUE
SKY
BLOG
(July
25,
2017),
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2017/07/25/insider-trading-personal-benefit-has-no-place-inmisappropriation-tipping-cases [https://perma.cc/QRE8-9DFP].
86
SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 288 (2d Cir. 2012) (“[T]ippee liability can be established if a tippee
knew or had reason to know that confidential information was initially obtained and transmitted
improperly (and thus through deception), and if the tippee intentionally or recklessly traded while in
knowing possession of that information.”).
87
For discussion of this issue, see generally WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 79, § 4.04.5. Rule
14e-3 is actually written to cover those “in possession” of proscribed information, see 17 CFR
§ 240.14e-3(a) (2017), which accords with the “possession” standard discussed infra.
88
E.g., SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325, 1337 (11th Cir. 1998) (“We believe that the use test best
comports with precedent and Congressional intent, and that mere knowing possession . . . is not a per se
violation.”); United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1067 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[W]e believe that the weight
of authority supports a ‘use’ requirement.”). But see Johnson v. Aljian, 394 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1198–99
(C.D. Cal. 2004) (adopting the lower “possession” standard in civil cases, distinguishing Smith as a
precedent for criminal matters).
Adler actually adopted an intermediate position, in which use is required but presumed based on
knowing possession—and the burden is on the defendant to rebut a presumption of use “by adducing
evidence that there was no causal connection between the information and the trade.” Adler, 137 F.3d at
1337.
89
The modern “knowledge” or “possession” standard has its genesis in the SEC’s investigation
into Sterling Drug, Inc. There, two directors sold shares after learning that news of the company’s
recent improvements in sales and income should be taken with a grain of salt. Report of Investigation in
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whether traders had prior, independent, and lawful reasons to execute a
trade; once they obtain proscribed information bearing on the trade, they
must disclose the information or abstain from trading.
The SEC’s answer, acquiesced to by both courts90 and Congress,91 is
that traders break the law if they trade while they are “aware” of proscribed
information.92 This standard is much closer to the noncausal “knowing
possession” standard than the “use” standard. And even those courts which
had endorsed a “use” standard in theory tended to apply it as though it were
a knowledge standard.93 Thus, American insider trading law generally

the Matter of Sterling Drug, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 14,675, 14 SEC Docket 824, 826,
1978 WL 198166 (Apr. 18, 1978). The directors claimed that they had ample reason to sell shares apart
from what they learned in that meeting, and so they did not trade because of the information. Id. at 827.
The Commission deemed their motives irrelevant, however:
Rule 10b-5 . . . does not require a showing that an insider sold his securities for the purpose of
taking advantage of material non-public information. Purchasers of securities in the public market
should be able to rely upon information available to the public at the time of the transaction. If an
insider sells his securities while in possession of material adverse non-public information, such an
insider is taking advantage of his position to the detriment of the public.
Id. The next major step came fifteen years later in the Second Circuit’s Teicher decision, which
seemingly endorsed a possession approach, albeit in dicta. United States v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112, 120–
21 (2d Cir. 1993) (discussing the superiority of a “knowing possession” standard compared to a “causal
connection” standard). The defendants had argued that “the district court’s jury charge erroneously
instructed the jury that the defendants could be found guilty of securities fraud based upon the mere
possession of fraudulently obtained material nonpublic information without regard to whether this
information was the actual cause of the sale or purchase of securities.” Id. at 119. The court was
skeptical of this argument but avoided ruling on the issue. Id. at 121.
90
See, e.g., United States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139, 158–59 (2d Cir. 2013) (discussing the
elevation of Teicher’s “knowing possession” standard to the “law of the Circuit” following the
promulgation of Rule 10b5-1). But see SEC v. Lipson, 278 F.3d 656, 660–61 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[I]f
Lipson would have sold the shares in the same amounts and on the same dates that he did sell them
even if he had not possessed any inside information, then he would be home free, because then the
existence of a causal connection between his inside information and the challenged sales would be
negated.”).
91
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(a)(1) (2012) (imposing civil fines for trading “while in possession
of” material nonpublic information.); id. § 78t-1(a) (providing for a private right of action against
defendants who traded “while in possession of” material nonpublic information).
92
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(b) (2017) (“[A] purchase or sale of a security of an issuer is ‘on the basis
of’ material nonpublic information about that security or issuer if the person making the purchase or
sale was aware of the material nonpublic information when the person made the purchase or sale.”).
93
This is because these courts typically reject the defendant’s alternative explanations for the trade.
E.g., SEC v. Mayhew, 916 F. Supp. 123, 131 (D. Conn. 1995) (“Defendant’s attempted justification of
why he purchased on those particular dates . . . is simply unpersuasive.”). A second reason that the
shoreline remains near Teicher, despite decisions urging a “use” standard, is that the SEC has not
acquiesced in those results. Instead, it promulgated Rule 10b5-1, which adopts an awareness standard,
i.e., a “knowing possession” standard. § 240.10b5-1(b). While there may be debate in theory about
whether we have a “use” or “possession” standard, there is no debate in practice for individuals who
would rather not be the subject of a ruinous government investigation (even one in which they will
ultimately prevail).
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operates to bar certain species of informed trading, regardless of whether
that information caused the trade.
B. Ad Hoc Theories
Apart from the two fraud-based theories of insider trading, several
other types of informed trading are prohibited through ad hoc provisions
meant to fill perceived gaps in the forgoing approaches. The most
important of these rules regulates trading in advance of tender offers. A
tender offer is a public invitation to sell or tender shares to an acquirer,94
often in connection with an attempt to take over a company without the
approval of the target company’s board. SEC Rule 14e-3 prohibits trading
while in possession of material nonpublic information about a pending
tender offer, without regard to whether there is a relationship of trust or
confidence and without the challenge of defining “on the basis of.”95

94

See Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 823–24 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (reciting the SEC’s
definition of tender offer as including “(1) active and widespread solicitation of public shareholders for
the shares of an issuer; (2) solicitation made for a substantial percentage of the issuer’s stock; (3) offer
to purchase made at a premium over the prevailing market price; (4) terms of the offer are firm rather
than negotiable; (5) offer contingent on the tender of a fixed number of shares, often subject to a fixed
maximum number to be purchased; (6) offer open only a limited period of time; (7) offeree subjected to
pressure to sell his stock . . . [(8)] public announcements of a purchasing program concerning the target
company precede or accompany rapid accumulation of large amounts of the target company’s
securities”) Note that Rule 14e-3 does not in fact define tender offer.
95
§ 240.14e-3. The bidder itself may, of course, buy shares while knowing about their own plans,
subject to the other disclosure requirements of the Williams Act. The SEC considered and rejected a
fuller prohibition that would have prohibited even the bidder from buying prior to its own tender offer.
Tender Offers, Securities Act Release No. 6,022, Exchange Act Release No. 15,548, Investment
Company Act Release No. 10,575, 44 Fed. Reg. 9,956, 9,976–78, 9,987–88 (proposed Feb. 15,
1979) (proposed Rule 14e–2); Tender Offers, 44 Fed. Reg. 70,326, 70,338, 70,348 (proposed Dec. 6,
1979) (proposed Rule 14e–2). The rule is only triggered if a bidder has taken a substantial step toward
commencing a tender offer, though the trader need not know who the bidder is nor whether that bidder
has in fact taken a substantial step. See 3C HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, SECURITIES
AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW § 19:30 (Supp. Dec. 2017). Furthermore, the defendant need not know
that the information is nonpublic or that the source was a bidder or a bidder’s associate, so long as she
has reason to know. Id.; see also SEC v. Ginsburg, 362 F.3d. 1292, 1304 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Rule 14e-3,
by its terms, does not require that the offender know or have reason to know that the information relates
to a tender offer, so long as the information in fact does relate to a tender offer and the offender knows
or has reason to know the information is nonpublic and was acquired by a person with the required
status.”). Likewise, Rule 14e-3 is triggered only if the informed trader knows that their information
comes from the bidder; the target company; or an officer, director, partner, or employee of the bidder or
target. § 240.14e-3(a); see also id. § 240.14e-3(b)(2) (establishing a defense for legal entities that
implement a compliance program intended to prevent agents from acquiring and trading on tender offer
information). For further discussion of Rule 14e-3, see generally WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 79,
§§ 9.01–04.
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C. Permitted Trading
Notwithstanding fraud-based theories, ad hoc prohibitions on some
trading, and an aggressive causation standard, the fact remains that
American insider trading law permits most forms of informed trading. As
in all of federal securities law, an advantage is only problematic if the
acquired information is material,96 meaning that there is “substantial
likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed
by the reasonable investor as having altered the ‘total mix’ of information
made available.”97 Likewise, there is no violation in trading on the basis of
public information, even if your counterparty does not know or has not
fully appreciated the information.98
More importantly, American law does not even prohibit much trading
on the basis of material, nonpublic information. We do not have a parity of
information approach to insider trading.99 That sort of broad prohibition
was advanced by the SEC in Cady, Roberts & Co. and accepted by the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Texas Gulf Sulphur, but the Supreme
Court in Chiaralla rejected the notion that it is generally illegal to take
advantage of an undisclosed informational advantage.100 Instead, trading is
restricted only if it falls within the scope of one of the forgoing “theories”
of insider trading or ad hoc prohibitions.101 Those who neither steal
information nor abuse their trusted role to get information may trade with
near impunity.102 Thus, “only some persons, under some circumstances,

96

See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988).
TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc. 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
98
United States v. Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 2d 363, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d 555 F. App’x 98 (2d
Cir. 2014) (stating that whether information is nonpublic “is largely a factual issue, turning on such
factors as written company policies, employee training, measures the employer has taken to guard the
information’s secrecy, the extent to which the information is known outside the employer’s place of
business, and the ways in which other employees may access and use the information”).
99
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233 (1980) (“[N]either the Congress nor the
Commission ever adopted a parity-of-information rule.”).
100
Compare In re Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 34-6668, 1961 WL 60638
(Nov. 8, 1961) (discussing the “inherent unfairness” when the parties to a trade do not have the same
information), and SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (stating
that the rule “is based in policy on the justifiable expectation of the securities marketplace that all
investors trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively equal access to material information”), with
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233 (rejecting a broad duty to disclose in favor of the rule that such duty “arises
from a specific relationship between two parties”).
101
Cf. Gubler, supra note 77, at 1240–54 (criticizing the classical theory as permissive of too much
insider trading).
102
For example, a famous football coach was acquitted for trading in advance of a merger, which
he discovered while eavesdropping on company executives attending a game. SEC v. Switzer, 590 F.
Supp. 756, 761–62 (W.D. Okla. 1984).
97
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will be barred from trading while in possession of material nonpublic
information.”103
While some—most notably the SEC—seem displeased that informed
trading is often unconstrained,104 others defend a presumption in favor of
lawful trading.105 Informed trading improves price accuracy and gives
traders a reason to do research in the first place.106
Perhaps most importantly for our purposes, American insider trading
law does not impose liability for much accidental or intentional tainting of
others with inside information. Innocent traders need not fear discovering
something that would ruin their trading options, nor do they need fear that a
competitor or adversary will salt the earth with injurious tips. All a trader
need do is refrain from misappropriating information, avoid positions of
trust, and stay far from the merger team, and then she can retain all of her
flexibility. We seem to have in our power the ability to avoid
wrongdoing—and preserve our trading freedoms—by just acting decently
and carefully.107
Or so the theory has been. The next Part shows how uneasy the safe
harbor really is. In fact, traders can and do become burdened with trading
prohibitions without any affirmative and culpable efforts to acquire
proscribed information, and the risk is far greater if an adversary seeks to
establish this state of affairs. Tainting with inside information is eminently
possible.
III. THE LAW PERMITTING INSIDER TAINTING
It is plain why managers and bidders might wish to disable the trades
of another person.108 Yet it is still natural to doubt that insider trading law

103

Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 657 (1983).
See, e.g., Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 7,881, Exchange
Act Release No. 43,154, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,599, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716 (Aug. 24,
2000) [hereinafter Regulation FD Final Rule] (defending the equal access ideal in promulgating
Regulation FD); see also Thomas Lee Hazen, Identifying the Duty Prohibiting Outsider Trading on
Material Nonpublic Information, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 881, 913 (2010) (arguing in favor of an equal
access rule).
105
See, e.g., Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN.
L. REV. 857, 885 (1983). For a discussion of the arguments for and against regulating insider trading,
see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 79, §§ 2.01–04.
106
See Kevin S. Haeberle & M. Todd Henderson, Information-Dissemination Law: The Regulation
of How Market-Moving Information Is Revealed, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1373, 1382 (2016) (discussing
the impact of hypothetical legal reforms on market prices).
107
See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 567 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[A] fiduciary duty cannot be
imposed unilaterally by entrusting a person with confidential information.”).
108
See supra Part I.
104
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could matter to any such stratagem. We have seen that American law often
allows traders to take full advantage of superior information.109
Likewise, it is natural to think that insider tainting would be selfdeterring because each instance of insider tainting would expose the tippers
(i.e., the actor who seeks to taint another) to serious legal risks themselves.
Yet insider tainting is indeed viable and credible. Section A shows
that there are many ways for a tipper to impose insider trading risks onto an
unwilling victim. Some methods actually make it illegal for the tippee to
trade. Other methods may not quite succeed in making the trade illegal, but
they still cast a pall over it. It is feasible for the tipper to deliver the tip in
such a way that the victim must fear legal risks. Even brave traders must
take into account the risk of prosecutor, plaintiff, or court error.
Next, Section B shows that such tipping is not self-deterring. There
are a number of relatively safe ways for tippers to perpetrate their tainting
plans. For example, securities fraud liability generally attaches only in the
presence of a trade; yet successful tainting blocks the victim’s trade, thus
protecting the tipper. Because a number of techniques exist for safely
tainting, bluffs become credible as another safe strategy.
Section C discusses tainting in the context of the three scenarios
(takeover defense, competitive bidding, and wolf packs) from Part I.
A. Tainting Is Viable
Insider tainting is viable because it is possible to impose serious legal
risks to an individual’s subsequent trades, even without her complicity or
consent. The following subsections explain how this is possible under the
various insider trading theories.
1. Preliminary Remarks: Risk
Insider tainting can deter trades even in cases where the odds of
enforcement and conviction are less than 100%. That is because of the high
costs of defending against a potential suit and the fierce penalties looming
even in cases where punishment is unlikely.
An insider trading conviction can entail serious monetary penalties110
or jail time.111 Even if a defendant is ultimately vindicated, the mere
accusation of wrongdoing can ruin a career or destroy a business enterprise.
109

See supra Part II.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(a)(1) (2012) (authorizing SEC to seek civil penalties when a person
violates the Exchange Act “by purchasing or selling a security . . . while in possession of material,
nonpublic information”); id. § 78u-1(a)(2) (authorizing penalties of up to “three times the profit gained
or loss avoided as a result of such unlawful purchase, sale, or communication”). For a discussion of the
civil money penalties that the SEC may seek against insider trading defendants, see generally WANG &
STEINBERG, supra note 79, § 7.03.4.
110
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For example, federal investigators effectively destroyed the $2 billion
Diamond Partners hedge fund merely by publicizing the fact that an
investigation had been initiated. Investors fled the fund rapidly in the wake
of the investigation.112 Years later, the FBI paid $6 million to the firm and
its managers in an uncommon recognition of the degree to which the fund
prevailed against the government in the subsequent insider trading trials.113
While the $6 million was surely appreciated, the principals and employees
of Diamondback were not remotely compensated for their losses,
underscoring the importance of avoiding controversy.114
In light of the costs and risks entailed by any investigation, tainting
can work even in cases where the probability of conviction is actually quite
low. Indeed, even a very low-level risk of liability may be enough to
disable a trader if her employer has a robust compliance program.115
Compliance officers may adopt categorical restrictions on trading, even
when risks are minute.116

111
See § 78ff(a) (providing for not more than $5 million in fines, twenty years’ imprisonment, or
both for any willful violation of the Exchange Act or any rule thereunder). For a discussion of the
criminal penalties against insider trading, see generally WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 79, § 7.02.
112
The fund announced its closure during the insider trading trial of its former employee, Todd
Newman. See Chad Bray, Diamondback Is Shutting Down, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 6, 2012),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324001104578163043667373604
[https://perma.cc/T7LJ-BN8Y].
113
See Matthew Goldstein, U.S. to Return $6 Million to Diamondback Capital in Insider Trading
Case, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/04/business/dealbook/us-to-return6-million-to-diamondback-capital-in-insider-trading-case.html
[https://perma.cc/6VJN-AZRN].
Diamondback was the home to Todd Newman, whose acquittal in the Second Circuit, United States v.
Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014), set in motion the Supreme Court’s recent Salman decision. See
Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 428 (2016) (abrogating Newman, at least in part).
114
If compensated under the traditional “two and twenty” rule, the manager of a $2 billion fund
would have been entitled to $40 million per year, plus 20% of the fund’s gains above some benchmark.
See Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in Private Equity Funds, 83 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1, 3 (2008).
115
Cf. Brief of Defendant-Appellant Todd Newman at *8, *44, United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d
438 (2d Cir. 2014) (No. 13-1837-cr(L)), 2013 WL 4497029 (acknowledging that the compliance
department was privy to many allegedly tipping emails). Tippers can fortify their tainting schemes by
looping compliance departments, which may be more risk averse than individual traders, into the tip.
The strategic invocation of compliance personnel is characteristic of the phenomenon of “offensive
compliance.” See Miriam Baer, Offensive Compliance, PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 21, 2012, 12:36 PM),
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2012/02/offensive-compliance.html
[https://perma.cc/HYJ6-87CC].
116
An overprotective approach may result from the compliance officers’ failure to understand the
nuances of the factual and legal context, a rational effort to build workable rules (that are simply not
right in every case), or the desire to assert their importance and protect their own reputation (which may
depend on a spotless compliance record). On the compliance industry and its incentives, see generally
William A. Birdthistle & M. Todd Henderson, Becoming a Fifth Branch, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 44–49
(2013).

749

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2. Preliminary Remarks: Disclosure
American law never prohibits trading on public information, so
involuntary tippees may regain their right to trade if they publicly disclose
the tainting information.117 This option limits the danger from tainting.
However, self-protective disclosure carries legal risks, too. If there is
any argument that the tippee had assumed a duty of confidentiality, their
disclosure exposes the tippee to liability for violating by disclosure.
Moreover, if the information turns out to be false, or if the disclosing tippee
does not publicize it with perfect accuracy, the tippee might herself be
accused of making an actionable misstatement.118
Even if the law allowed the tippee to disclose, doing so will still leave
her worse off than if she had never been tainted.119 More interestingly, the
choice to disclose rather than abstain reveals information about the
disclosing tippee: to opt for disclosure, the trader must think that there is a
trading opportunity with respect to this stock apart from the one disclosed.
Otherwise, why would she disclose rather than abstain? If she discloses the
tainting information, she also hints at her remaining undisclosed
information.
For example, a would-be acquirer might be tainted with a peek at
quarterly earnings. If she discloses those earnings to the world, it will
signal that she wishes to buy the company and had that wish apart from the
now-disclosed earnings. This will lead other traders to draw inferences or
engage in additional research. Does the trader know that one of the
company’s drugs has been approved or a lawsuit settled?
Careful observers (e.g., competitors, arbitragers) will read the tea
leaves. They may not know exactly what motivates the tainted trader to
disclose, but they will sometimes be able to make inferences. If Mark
Cuban discloses that he was given information about an upcoming stock
offering, it will be easy to infer that he has independent reasons to sell his
stock.

117
The most expansive formulation of American insider trading law is the “disclose or abstain”
rule. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 (1980). The trader could disclose in a recognized
public forum, such as a newspaper like the Wall Street Journal, or through some regulatory filing. For
example, the SEC requires anyone making a tender offer to file a Schedule TO containing numerous
disclosures. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-3(a)(2) (2017) (requiring tender offerors to file Schedule TO); id.
§ 240.14d-100 (Schedule TO). One such disclosure could involve any unintended tips received.
118
See § 240.10b-5 (“It shall be unlawful . . . [t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact . . .
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.”).
119
Disclosing the proscribed information is likely to cause the market price to move. If the
information is consistent with the victim’s reason to trade, then the disclosure makes the victim’s
subsequent sale or purchase occur at a less optimal price. The disclosure to the trader therefore
discourages her to same degree that a public disclosure by the tipper would have discouraged her.
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Even if it is difficult to determine from the context what direction the
tainted party’s own prior trading interest is, other traders will react to the
signal that there is an informed trader about to act. Some traders may
engage in further research about the security, knowing now that there is
some useful information to be discovered. Market makers may simply
become cautious, widening bid-ask spreads. Regardless, the tainting party
will have frustrated the victim’s trading efforts even if the latter opts for
disclosure because prophylactic disclosure still signals interest and implies
information.
3. Techniques: Rule 14e-3
At least in the tender offer context, Rule 14e-3 proves a potent vector
for insider tainting. Rule 14e-3 prohibits trading while in possession of
undisclosed information about a tender offer.120 Unlike the fraud-based
insider trading theories, 14e-3 does not require any special relationship
between the trader and either the source or the counterparty; it is enough to
trade while knowing the proscribed information.121 It is for this reason that
14e-3 has been variously called a “strict liability”122 offense or vindication
of “equal access” principles.123
120

See § 240.14e-3.
SEC v. Mayhew, 121 F.3d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[R]ule 14e-3 . . . imposes liability . . .
without regard to whether the trader owes a fiduciary duty to respect the confidentiality of the
information.”); SEC v. Anticevic, No. 05 CV 6991(KMW), 2010 WL 2077196, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May
14, 2010) (“Rule 14e-3 imposes an obligation ‘to disclose or abstain’ from trading or tipping regardless
of whether the individual (1) owes a fiduciary duty to respect the confidentiality of the information; (2)
has knowledge that the material, non-public information in his or her possession relates to a tender
offer; and/or (3) actually used the information.” (citations omitted)); SEC v. Sekhri, No. 98 Civ.
2320(RPP), 2002 WL 31100823 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2002) (same, citing Mayhew).
The wide scope of Rule 14e-3 is no coincidence. The SEC promulgated this rule to respond to the
perceived injustice of its loss in Chiarella. See generally 18 DONALD LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING
REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT, AND PREVENTION § 7:1 (Supp. Apr. 2017); Karen A. Tallman, Note,
Private Causes of Action Under SEC Rule 14e-3, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 290, 295–96 (1983)
(discussing whether Rule 14e-3 is consistent with Congress’s purpose in enacting the Williams Act).
122
See, e.g., John P. Anderson, Anticipating a Sea Change for Insider Trading Law: From Trading
Plan Crisis to Rational Reform, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 339, 369 n.208; Joanna B. Apolinsky, Insider
Trading as Misfeasance: The Yielding of the Fiduciary Requirement, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 493, 535
(2011); Maria Babajanian, Rewarded for Being Remote: How United States v. Newman Improperly
Narrows Liability for Tippees, 46 STETSON L. REV. 199, 218 (2016); Carol B. Swanson, Insider
Trading Madness: Rule 10b5-1 and the Death of Scienter, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 147, 179 (2003).
123
See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Incorporating State Law Fiduciary Duties into the Federal
Insider Trading Prohibition, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1189, 1198 (1995) (asserting that Rule 14e-3
represents an effort to “revive the [Texas Gulf Sulphur] equal access to information rule”); Thomas W.
Joo, The Worst Test of Truth: The “Marketplace of Ideas” as Faulty Metaphor, 89 TUL. L. REV. 383,
430 (2014) (stating, in the context of Rule 14e-3, that the SEC “views equalization . . . as an important
aspect of market health”); Steve Thel, Statutory Findings and Insider Trading Regulation, 50 VAND. L.
REV. 1091, 1101 (1997) (describing the promulgation of Rule 14e-3 as “adoption of a principle of equal
access to information”). Rule 14e-3 is also said to support a parity-of-information regime. See, e.g.,
121
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Rule 14e-3 does contain some protective limitations: The Rule is only
violated if the information came from certain sources (e.g., the bidder) and
is used after someone takes a “substantial step” toward a nonpublic tender
offer.
Still, it is significant what limits are not imposed. The trader need not
know who the bidder is124 or whether that bidder has in fact taken a
substantial step.125 Furthermore, the defendant need not know whether the
information is nonpublic or whether the source was a bidder or their
associate, so long as she has reason to know.126
In theory, all a tipper needs to do to taint a trader is to state that a
tender offer is pending with respect to the security in question. If this
statement is true, it would then be unlawful for the victim to trade. Even if
it were false, prudent traders would become more cautious, given the
penalties involved. They might not trade even if they are not sure that a
tender offer is forthcoming or they were never told who the bidder might
be. They would rationally pause if they think it is possible that a court will
later determine that a tender offer is merely likely, that a court would think
one was pending, or that a prosecutor or plaintiff might think one was
pending. Therefore, the potential for Rule 14e-3 to deter trading is not
limited to the tender offer context—it applies in any context where a tender
offer is plausible.
4. Techniques: Fraud-Based Theories
The fraud-based theories (classical and misappropriation) likewise
permit insider tainting. This may be surprising because these theories
require a fraudulent breach of a duty and innocent recipients of information
do not take any such fraudulent actions. Even the risk of wrongful
enforcement based on ambiguous facts would seem to be low because
traders can protect themselves by avoiding situations where they assume a
confidence or appear to confer a benefit on any information source. When

Roberta S. Karmel, Outsider Trading on Confidential Information—A Breach in Search of a Duty,
20 CARDOZO L. REV. 83, 96 (1998); Joel Seligman, The Reformulation of Federal Securities Law
Concerning Nonpublic Information, 73 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1135 (1985) (“The only significant difference
between [R]ule 14e-3 and the parity of information approach concerns the scope of application.”).
124
See United States v. O’Hagan, 139 F.3d 641, 648 n.3 (8th Cir. 1998) (describing the fact that
the defendant did not know the identity of the bidder as “of little significance”).
125
See id. at 650 (“The rule does not require the defendant to have knowledge of these acts.”);
BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, supra note 95, § 19:30.
126
See SEC v. Ginsburg, 362 F.3d. 1292, 1304 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Rule 14e-3, by its terms, does
not require that the offender know or have reason to know that the information relates to a tender offer,
so long as the information in fact does relate to a tender offer and the offender knows or has reason to
know the information is nonpublic and was acquired by a person with the required status.”);
BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, supra note 95, § 19:30.
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someone asks for a confidence or a quid pro quo, the trader can
emphatically decline.
Yet that is not quite right as a statement of the fraud-based theories.
Actually, liability hinges on what the tippee knows about the information’s
provenance, rather than what the tippee actually did. The tippee need not
breach a duty of trust and confidence; insider trading liability follows if
someone breached a duty and the tippee is aware of this breach.127
A tipper can therefore taint a victim by delivering information as well
as a story explaining why it is proscribed. For example, a tipper could
deliver material information and also declare, “My brother bribed an
executive to get that information.” If this is statement is true, then it is
illegal for the tippee to trade.128 If it is not true, then the law does not
actually bar trading, but a reasonable trader may be unsure whether it is
true or whether a plaintiff or prosecutor will believe that it was true. Either
way, the information’s origin story casts a pall over the trader’s plans.
The forgoing example concerned a statement about the information
having been misappropriated, but it is also possible to cloud information
under the classical theory. Recall that the classical theory bars trading when
the source breached a duty by disclosing the information in order to obtain
a personal benefit such as improved reputation, reciprocal favors, or the
simple joy of helping “a trading friend or relative.”129 To implicate this
theory, a tipper could say, “By the way, I gave this information to you
because I expect reciprocal favors, and also because I genuinely want to
benefit you, my friend.”130 Such a comment establishes that the secret was
127
See SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 288 (2d Cir. 2012) (“[T]ippee liability can be established if a
tippee knew or had reason to know that confidential information was initially obtained and transmitted
improperly (and thus through deception), and if the tippee intentionally or recklessly traded while in
knowing possession of that information.”); accord United States v. Parigian, 824 F.3d 5, 11 (1st Cir.
2016) (citing Obus for the same).
128
When the source breaches a duty in acquiring or sharing the information, the tippee can be a
“Participant[] After the Fact.” WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 79, § 5.03[1].
129
Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 427–28 (2016). The latter is akin to trading and then
sharing the cash proceeds. See id.
130
It is true that the tippee or the court may believe that this postscript is a pretext. It is certainly
false that a tipper intends to benefit a tippee if her principal goal is actually to frustrate the tippee’s
trading plans. Nor may a malicious tipper always expect loyalty from the tippee. See Langevoort, supra
note 3, at 446 (“[T]rickery can hardly lead to a reasonable expectation of fidelity.”). Note, however, that
cooperative tipping in the wolf-pack context may conceivably involve tipping both to hinder and to help
the tippee, whose tainting is what permits them to join the potentially profitable acquisition coalition.
See supra Section I.C.
Moreover, other classical theory postscripts may actually succeed in establishing liability. Directors
breach their duty of loyalty when they take unreasonable steps to entrench themselves. See, e.g., AC
Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 114 (Del. Ch. 1986) (finding that a
defensive step taken to resist an any-and-all cash tender offer was not reasonable in relation to the
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given in breach of the tipper’s duty, and knowledge of that breach taints the
tippee.
Notice that both of these examples involve the tainting backstory
being given after the information, a technique we can call “postscripting.” I
have structured the examples this way in order to emphasize how hard it is
for the trader to protect herself from tainting. Any time one learns
information, the source may soon after disclose its problematic source.
Only if a trader breaks off all contact with the world can she avoid hearing
information along with its potentially problematic postscript.
It may be argued that at least some forms of postscripts cannot
establish liability precisely because they come too late. A statement that the
tipper trusts and expects confidence from the tippee arguably creates
obligations only going forward. Leon Cooperman, a billionaire hedge fund
manager accused of insider trading, staked his defense on precisely this
objection to postscripting liability. The SEC charged Cooperman, and his
funds, with buying shares in Atlas Pipeline Partners on the basis of
information disclosed to him by Atlas executives on three phone calls—
information he was expected to keep confidential.131 Cooperman argued
that an expectation of confidentiality, if any existed, emerged only after the
tip was given.132
While plausible, there are three problems with Cooperman’s position.
First, Cooperman’s argument would only prevent postscripting
relating to the tippee’s duty of confidentiality. Other forms of postscripting,
such as declaring the information to be the product of misappropriation,
would remain effective.
Second, it is not clear as a general matter that a statement (or omission
of a vital truthful statement) about trust must precede disclosure. While it

threat, and thus a breach of the directors’ duty of loyalty); see also supra Section I.A. It would therefore
violate the duty of loyalty for a director to share information as part of an unreasonable entrenchment
effort. When a manager shares information in order to stop a takeover that endangers her job, the
manager arguably defrauds her principal by using the corporation’s secrets to obtain a personal benefit.
Therefore, the following postscript plausibly taints the tippee: “I told you that information in the hopes
that it will disable your trading plans, and thereby save my job.” Candid antitakeover tainting plausibly
succeeds in tainting.
131
See Complaint ¶ 34, SEC v. Cooperman, 243 F. Supp. 3d 597 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (No. 2:16-cv05043-JS), 2016 WL 5239782 (stating that the Atlas Pipeline executive who shared confidential
information with Cooperman “believed Cooperman had an obligation not to use this information to
trade APL securities. Indeed, during one of these conversations . . . Cooperman explicitly agreed that he
could not and would not use the confidential information”).
132
See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 14, Cooperman,
243 F. Supp. 3d 597 (No. 2:16-cv-05403-JS), 2016 WL 9113200 (“[I]nformation can be
misappropriated only if the source of the information provides it to the corporate outsider after the
outsider has agreed to keep the information confidential.”).
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might seem that fraud is only fraud if it induces some form of reliance (like
disclosure of information), the Supreme Court recently rejected this
proposition in another complex investment setting.133
Third, as an evidentiary matter, defendants will not always be secure
in the proof that they ended the conversation or disclaimed confidentiality
prior to the time liability attached. Will the SEC or a jury believe that the
trader deleted an email after the first paragraph signaled that the subsequent
information is proscribed? Traders may wisely fear that their trades will be
scrutinized in light of what they might have read or heard or agreed to. This
risk is even greater if other witnesses have their own version of the events
and timing.134
Despite promising a vigorous defense, Cooperman settled the case. He
paid $4.9 million, agreed to have an independent compliance monitor look
after his fund until 2022, and promised not to publicly deny wrongdoing
(although he was not forced to admit wrongdoing either).135 More
importantly, Cooperman’s fund had shrunk from about $9.4 billion under
management to just $3.5 billion.136 Cooperman estimated his losses from

133

See Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, 136 S. Ct. 1581, 1590 (2016) (holding that one can commit
“actual fraud” for the purposes of the bankruptcy code even when a defendant made no statements and
owed no duty of candor, and the victim in no way relied on any deception; rather, intentional efforts to
hinder creditors could be a fraud even if the debts were accumulated with perfect honesty (quoting
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (2012))).
134
Recall that in Mark Cuban’s case, the tipping CEO stated in his deposition that Cuban had
agreed to confidentiality. See supra text accompanying note 2.
135
See Joint Motion to Enter Final Judgment Pursuant to Consent, Exhibit A, Consent of
Defendant Leon G. Cooperman ¶¶ 2, 4, Cooperman, 243 F. Supp. 3d 597 (No. 2:16-cv-05043). He thus
paid over $3 million more than the alleged gains from insider trading, see id. ¶ 2 (trading gains alleged
to be $1.76 million), and Cooperman promised not to collect insurance or indemnification for his
personal share of the sum, see id. ¶ 3.
136
Compare Simone Foxman & Erik Schatzker, Cooperman Says Omega’s Assets Fell to $4
Billion
Amid
Case,
BLOOMBERG
(Oct.
11,
2016,
10:53
AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-11/cooperman-says-omega-s-assets-dropped-to-4billion-amid-case [https://perma.cc/WC32-KY2L] (stating that Omega had $9.4 billion in assets under
management at the time when Omega first disclosed SEC subpoenas), with Bob Van Voris & Matt
Robinson, Cooperman Agrees to Lighter Penalty in Deal With Trump’s SEC, BLOOMBERG (published
May
18,
2017,
3:49
PM;
updated
May
18,
2017,
6:36
PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-05-18/cooperman-omega-agree-to-settle-sec-insidertrading-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/BG37-Y9GX] (stating that the firm has $3.5 billion in assets under
management). More conservative estimates would time the drop from the beginning of the SEC’s actual
lawsuit. In that case, the decline would only be from $5.4 billion. Van Voris & Robinson, supra. Of
course, some of this decline may have been a result of forces unrelated to the SEC. See Rob Copeland
& Timothy W. Martin, Hedge Fund Star: We Are ‘Under Assault,’ WALL ST. J. (May 12, 2016),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/hedge-fund-star-we-are-under-assault-1463071444
[https://perma.cc/A9ST-7KPT] (noting massive outflows from the entire hedge fund sector).
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the investigation would exceed $100 million due to managing a smaller
corpus,137 a figure that jives with typical management fees.138
Cooperman’s settlement signifies that enforcement is costly even if a
trader has a strong legal argument. It also denies the public a full airing of
his theory. Had he pursued his claim, we might have had an answer to the
question of whether post hoc demands for confidentiality can or cannot
taint a trader. As it stands, the lesson is that traders face costly risks under
the fraud theories for even postscript tainting, and that means that the
arsenal for would-be tainters is quite substantial.
B. Tainting Is Credible
The law of insider trading creates risks for tippers too. They can be
charged for perpetrating or abetting insider trading.139 Moreover, specific
rules prohibit tipping even if no trading occurs.140 Finally, even if the law
137
See Berkeley Lovelace Jr., Leon Cooperman: Our Assets Under Management Shrank by More
than Half to $3.4 Billion After SEC Charges, CNBC (published Jan 5, 2017 12:01 PM; updated Jan. 5,
2017, 12:54 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2017/01/05/leon-cooperman-assets-under-management-shrankby-more-than-half.html [https://perma.cc/4TY4-YKCE].
138
Fund managers customarily also charge a 2% annual fee as well as a performance fee based on
fund returns. A 2% fee on $5.9 billion (the difference between the high and low) is $118 million. See
supra note 114.
139
See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 79, §5.03.1 (noting that a trading tippee’s liability is
derivative of a tipper’s Rule 10b-5 violation).
140
Regulation FD prohibits companies from selectively granting early peeks at company secrets to
select shareholders and market professionals. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a) (2017) (“Whenever an issuer,
or any person acting on its behalf, discloses any material nonpublic information . . . to [certain]
person[s] . . . the issuer shall make public disclosure of that information . . . .”). The relevant persons
are securities market professionals and shareholders who are likely to trade on the information. See id.
§ 243.100(b)(1). Disclosures can be cured by filing an 8-K or a similarly public dissemination. See id.
§ 243.101(e).
Violations of Regulation FD can result in civil and administrative enforcement actions but not
private civil or public criminal actions. See Regulation FD Final Rule, supra note 104. There has been
some debate about whether Regulation FD is supposed to contribute to the insider trading
jurisprudence. Compare Michael D. Guttentag, Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 69 FLA. L.
REV. 519 (2017) (arguing that Regulation FD should contribute to insider trading jurisprudence, and
that language to the contrary is better read as disclaiming private civil actions), with Pritchard, supra
note 76, at 870 (arguing that violations of Regulation FD are not fraudulent and so do not support an
insider trading theory). The source of this disagreement is § 243.102. It provides: “No failure to make a
public disclosure required solely by [Regulation FD] shall be deemed to be a violation of Rule 10b-5
under the Securities Exchange Act.” § 243.102 (citation omitted); see also Selective Disclosure and
Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 7,787, Exchange Act Release No. 42,259, Investment
Company Release Act No. 24,209, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,594 (proposed Dec. 28, 1999) (codified at
17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100-243.103 (2017)) [hereinafter Regulation FD Proposed Rule] (“The approach we
propose does not . . . revisit the insider trading issues addressed in Dirks.”).
Regulation FD marked a change in American disclosure practices. In his majority opinion in Dirks,
Justice Powell specifically rejected a parity-of-information theory on the ground that issuers sometimes
needed to seed valuable information in order to curry favor from analysts—a legitimate corporate
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were no obstacle, many tippers would balk at their tainting strategy out of
fear that the tippee would be emboldened by the tip; a tainting plan is
foolish if your victim will be delighted to trade after receiving the tip.
If these risks were sufficiently great, then the strategic tipping plans
discussed infra would be irrational for most potential tippers and there
would be no insider tainting to diagnose or prosecute. Moreover, bluffs of
tainting would not be credible.
However, there are ample places where the law provides cover to
tippers. Sometimes, the cover is a safe harbor¾conduct that is strictly
legal.141 Other times, the cover is incomplete, either activated only by
contingent facts or dependent upon evidentiary practicalities for assurance.
These latter protections do far less to encourage insider tainting. However,
rational tippees will not assume that all tippers are rational. They will give
some credence to the possibility that a desperate or optimistic tipper may
act even without full protection.
1. Obscured Tips
Tippers can protect themselves by hiding their identities or tipping
information that is, in the end, not actually proscribed.
Anonymous tips do some work in protecting the tipper. A tipper can
deliver tips though an anonymous email, letter, phone call, or even human
surrogate. These tips allow information to be sent with substantially
reduced liability for the tipper and so render credible the threat that some
other tips might be true.142 Tippees may take anonymous information less
purpose. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658–59 (1983) (describing how analysts ask corporate
officers for information in order to judge a security’s market worth); see also Regulation FD Final Rule,
supra note 104, at 51,716 n.7 (“[I]n light of the ‘personal benefit’ test set forth in the Supreme Court’s
decision in Dirks . . . many have viewed issuer selective disclosures to analysts as protected from
insider trading liability.” (citation omitted)). The legitimacy of this practice was undermined in the
wake of the collapse of the dot-com bubble. In part, it seemed unfair that analysts and their patrons got
better information than everyone else. In part, there was a concern that analysts were thereby corrupted
by the tips; they were unwilling to criticize companies, lest their access to timely information dry up.
See Regulation FD Proposed Rule, supra, at 72,592; see also Gretchen Morgenson, How Did So Many
Get It So Wrong?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/31/business/how-didso-many-get-it-so-wrong.html [https://perma.cc/YX6N-4Q7L] (describing concern over analyst
corruption). This latter concern drove home one of the many ironies baked into information regulation.
Practices thought to improve information dissemination—giving true information to individuals whose
reputations depend on sharing it—leads to inferior information, as those individuals compromised other
aspects of their message.
141
Tippers must be cautious even when the law is on their side, for the very reasons discussed
supra Section III.A, concerning ambiguous facts. But they can be more confident than tippees that they
will prevail because, as the perpetrator of the scheme, they can take steps to preserve evidence
establishing the legality of their tip.
142
There remain meaningful risks in these cases. Law enforcement officials have powerful forensic
tools and may be able uncover the source of information. See Peter J. Henning, More Use of Wiretaps Is
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seriously than attributed information, but prudent tippees may still change
their plans in light of such tips.
Safer, and more effective, is for a tipper to share false information. If
information turns out to be incorrect, there is no breach in a tipper’s
disclosure.143 A tipper can almost risklessly send false tips to the tippee in
order to complicate their trading options.
The potential for false tips does much to protect tippers, but such tips
do not render insider tainting credible by themselves. False tips probably
create no trading liability for the tippee.144 If all tainting is based on false
tips masquerading as true, the entire enterprise will not be credible.145
However, false tips can make for credible bluffs if an appreciable portion
of them are real or carry serious risks of liability for the tippee. Fortunately
for tainting perpetrators, the law allows many avenues for lawful, and
therefore credible, tipping. We will therefore proceed to examine various
channels for credible tainting.
2. Faithful Tipping
The law generally tolerates “faithful” tippers (i.e., those who tip for a
corporate purpose). The court in Dirks held that the law is only broken if
“the insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his
disclosure . . . . i.e., whether the insider receives a direct or indirect
personal benefit from the disclosure, such as a pecuniary gain or a

Likely to Come in Trading Cases, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2013), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/
06/24/more-use-of-wiretaps-is-likely-to-come-in-trading-cases
[https://perma.cc/9DRW-NNMX]
(describing investigative tools).
143
Of course, the dissemination of lies is often illegal under our securities laws. See Bateman
Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 304–05 (1985) (permitting the recipient of a false
tip to sue the tipper, despite the in pari delicto defense); see also SEC v. Pirate Inv’r LLC, 580 F.3d
233, 254 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding liable the seller of false tips). Securities fraud is only actionable in
private suits when relied upon to buy or sell. If the tippee disbelieves the tip, she does not rely. If she
believes the tip and relies, it will be by abstaining from trading. But nontraders have no standing under
Rule 10b-5. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 751–52 (1975) (noting that the
court was “unable to locate a single decided case from any court . . . which would support the right of
[nonbuyers or sellers of a security] to bring a private suit under Rule 10b-5”). When a trader actually
trades because of the tip, she will have little desire to make this confession in order to incriminate a
tipper.
144
See Matthew D. Menghini, Note, The Availability of the In Pari Delicto Defense in Tippee–
Tipper Rule 10b-5 Actions After Dirks v. SEC, 62 WASH. U. L.Q. 519, 540–42 (1984) (discussing a
tippee’s liability for trades on false tips). See generally WANG & STEINBERG, supra, note 79, § 4.01 &
nn.14–16 (discussing the scope of Rule 10b-5 and various defenses available to the defendant).
However, if the tippee is unsure about the truth of the false tip, she can be convicted of an attempt to
violate Rule 10b-5 or the federal mail and wire fraud acts. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 79,
§§ 4.01 & nn.14–16, 5.02[8][f] & nn.467–69, 5.02[8][g] & n.480, 11.01 & n.5.
145
Recipients of information that they know to be false may still be deterred from trading if the
recipients are unsure whether regulators will readily accept that the information was false.
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reputational benefit that will translate into future earnings.”146 Tippers who
do not obtain such a personal benefit can tip without violating the law. The
Dirks personal benefit limitation was intended to protect selective
disclosures made to help the issuer. The example considered in Dirks was
disclosure to stock analysts.147
Although not rooted in Rule 10b-5’s classical theory, Rule 14e-3
liability for trading on tender offers provides tippers with a good faith
exception. Tippers are not liable for disclosures to those involved in
planning, financing, preparing, or executing a tender offer,148 nor are they
liable for any disclosures pursuant to law.149
The law used to tolerate a great deal more faithful tipping than it now
does.150 Indeed, the very conduct at issue in Dirks is now proscribed by
Regulation FD.151 However, Regulation FD only disallows selective
disclosure to certain market professionals and to shareholders who the
tipper reasonably foresees will trade.152 It would seem that tips to would-be
buyers of stock are not disallowed. Thus, tipping is not barred under
Regulation FD to head off bidders and acquirers. Likewise, if the tipper
believes the shareholder will not trade—say, because of the risk of insider
trading liability—then Regulation FD would not seem to be triggered
because they do not foresee trading. Furthermore, Regulation FD applies
only to reporting companies, leaving many companies unaffected.153
Finally, Regulation FD violations do not give rise to private rights of

146
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662–63 (1983). This personal-benefit test was affirmed with little
modification in the Supreme Court’s Salman decision. Salman reaffirmed that a tipper may violate the
law if he “makes a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend.” Salman v. United
States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 427 (2016) (emphases omitted) (quoting Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664); see also supra
note 85 and accompanying text. Salman thus retained the notion that, absent a qualifying personal
benefit of that sort, there is no violation.
147
See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 658 (“Imposing a duty to disclose or abstain solely because a person
knowingly receives material nonpublic information from an insider and trades on it could have an
inhibiting influence on the role of market analysts . . . .”). The Dirks court also noted that the SEC
recognized the importance of analysts to the health of the securities markets. See id.
148
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(d)(1)(ii) (2017).
149
See id. § 240.14e-3(d)(1)(iii) (exempting from liability any disclosures made “pursuant to a
requirement of any statute or rule or regulation promulgated thereunder”).
150
See Guttentag, supra note 140, at 524-25 (discussing how the adoption of Regulation FD and
the rise of the misappropriation theory have narrowed the scope of faithful tipping).
151
See id. For discussion of Regulation FD, see generally WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 79,
§ 5.02[3][c][iii].
152
It is also worth noting that Regulation FD only covers individuals speaking for a corporate
issuer. See supra note 141.
153
See 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(b) (defining “issuer” to include only reporting companies).
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action.154 Thus, even those who actually violate it in their strategic tainting
face a risk only if government enforcers take interest.
3. Successful Tainting
In most cases, tipping is illegal only if the tippee will trade. This is
because Section 10(b), the statute under which most insider trading is
pursued, regulates only conduct “in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.”155 Accordingly, there can be no liability for conduct which
does not result in an actual securities transaction, even if the conduct’s
chief evil was in discouraging a planned transaction.156 Therefore,
successful tainting fully avoids most tipper liability under our securities
laws.157
It may appear imprudent for the tipper to take actions that are only
safe if they achieve their desired effect, but the strategy is less risky than it
may appear. A core finding in game theory indicates that the second to last
mover in a game can often make costly ultimatums to the last mover.158 In

154
See Regulation FD Final Rule, supra note 104, at 51,718; see also 17 C.F.R. § 243.102
(providing that Regulation FD violations are not Rule 10b-5 violations).
155
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012). Other provisions contain similar limitations. See, e.g., id. § 77q(a)
(prohibiting fraud “in the offer or sale of any securities”). Even more expansively, Rule 14e-3’s good
faith exception is available even if there is a trade, so long as the tipper does not have reason to think
that the tippee will trade. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(d); see also supra notes 151–55 and accompanying
text. When tainting law-abiding citizens, tippers may be justifiably confident that no trade will occur. It
is therefore possible that a tipper could escape liability under Rule 14e-3 even if a trade actually occurs.
156
See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 754–55 (1975) (declining to allow
private damage actions under Rule 10b-5 by plaintiffs who were neither purchasers nor sellers of
securities).
157
For further discussion of this issue, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 79, § 5.02.8(f). An
interesting related question is whether mail or wire fraud convictions could be secured, even in the
absence of a trade. See Wang, supra note 76, at 254 & n.124, 255 nn.127–28, 257 n.133 (comparing the
scope of Rule 10b-5 to that of the mail and wire fraud statutes).
158
See THOMAS SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 83 (3d prtg. 1966) (“[W]hat one player
can do to avert mutual damage affects what another player will do to avert it . . . .”). Other features of
the game suggest that the tipper can control the outcomes. The risk to the tipper is often smaller than the
risk to the tippee. For example, Rule 14e-3 allows a good faith defense to tippers, but there is no good
faith defense for the tippee. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(d)(1). Even if a court might not ultimately accept
that the tipper acted in good faith, the availability of the defense gives tippers more leverage against
investigators and prosecutors. Even where the law is not more favorable to tippers, the fact that it is less
developed than tippee liability may deter some prosecutors. Cf. Guttentag, supra note 140, at 523-24
(“[N]o obvious common law precedent suggests how to determine when the selective disclosure of
material nonpublic information constitutes a deceptive practice.”). These differences in elements matter
because tippees can be liable even when the tipper is not. See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 486 F.3d
315, 323 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting that a tippee may be convicted in “the rare case where the tipper is
acquitted and yet the relationship between the tipper and the tippee is such that the tippee may yet be
prosecuted for acting upon the tipper’s breach”). In a game that imposes risks only if two parties both
violate the law, the party with lesser potential punishment may sometimes take liberties knowing that
the other party faces even higher incentives to prevent a bad outcome.
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parallel, so long as the tippee is concerned enough to abstain, she protects
her tipper.
The tippee has the last clear chance to avoid liability for both herself
and the tipper. The tipper takes a risk by sharing information, but the tippee
must decide unilaterally whether to expose herself to legal risks by trading.
If the tippee opts not to trade, she protects both herself and the tipper.
Importantly, the tippee might abstain for many reasons. She might be
normatively concerned about fairness or the authoritative status of the law,
she may fear government investigation, or she may worry about how
insider trading would affect her status within a company.
C. Tainting in Context
To show how insider trading law may be deployed as a sword, this
Section returns to the three contexts described in Part I in which an
individual would like to disable the trades of another.
1. Tainting by Managers
Managers have recently discovered the power of insider trading law to
disrupt involuntary changes in ownership. In one recent example, a target
company used insider trading law as part of its arsenal of antitakeover
devices in order to resist both a hostile tender offer and an activist
campaign. The colorful characters involved, the terrific sums of money,
and the novel uses of legal stratagem made the affair national news.159
Though there has been no suggestion of strategic tainting, the facts are
illustrative of the power of insider tainting to disrupt takeover attempts.
In 2014, Pershing Square and Valeant bought shares of Allergan, the
pharmaceutical company that makes Botox.160 Pershing Square is a wellknown activist investment fund, which buys shares with the goal of
exerting influence over management, often in order to increase dividend
payments. Valeant is a competitor to Allergan, interested in acquiring
Allergan for strategic purposes but also to fund dividend payments by
slashing R&D.161
159
See, e.g., Antoine Gara, Bill Ackman’s Insider Trading Lawsuit May Cost Pershing Square
Investors $75 Million, FORBES (Mar. 29, 2017, 6:25 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/antoinegara/
2017/03/29/bill-ackmans-insider-trading-lawsuit-may-cost-pershing-square-investors-75million/#4cf8d506849a [https://perma.cc/YZ6P-Y4BX].
160
To be slightly more accurate, the shares were acquired by PS Fund 1, a subsidiary of Pershing
Square formed as an acquisition vehicle. PS Fund 1 was 97% owned by Pershing Square and 3% owned
by Valeant. See Complaint for Violations of Securities Laws ¶¶ 7, 10, 59, Allergan, Inc.
v. Valeant Pharm. Int’l, Inc., No. 8:14-CV-01214 (C.D. Cal. dismissed Apr. 9, 2015), 2014 WL
10726137. PS Fund 1 acquired 9.7% of Allergan’s stock between February 25, 2014, and April 21,
2014. Id. ¶ 66.The facts in this section are generally drawn from the various court opinions.
161
Valeant had been rebuffed in a 2012 friendly takeover offer. Id. ¶ 48.
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Pershing Square and Valeant were mutually aware of one another’s
plans. Supposedly, Valeant first approached Pershing Square in pursuit of
financing for an attempted takeover of Allergan. Valeant would also stand
to gain if Pershing Square acquired a large stake of shares with the
intention of voting alongside Valeant in their control efforts. It would allow
Valeant to exercise outsize influence without as large a capital outlay and
without immediately filing the Williams Act disclosures triggered by large
investments.162 Pershing Square, for its part, would also appreciate an ally
in its attempt to shake up Allergan—and early knowledge of Valeant’s
tender offer would lock in almost assured gains for stock acquired at pretender offer prices. On the day the tender offer was announced, Allergan’s
share price spiked some 30%, generating perhaps a billion dollars in profit
for Pershing Square.163
Allergan’s board disliked both the activist and the hostile acquirer and
sought to use insider trading law as a defensive weapon. Allergan sued,
arguing that the acquirers’ coordinated campaign violated Rule 14e-3’s ban
on insider trading in the lead-up to a tender offer.164 Specifically, they
alleged that Pershing Square violated the rule by buying shares while aware
of Valeant’s tender offer plans and Valeant violated the rule by informing
Pershing Square of those plans. The presiding court agreed that the facts
“raised serious questions as to whether Defendants’ conduct . . . . violated
Rule 14e-3” and granted a partial injunction.165 Allergan pursued these
arguments in court166 and on the floor of Congress.167 Former shareholders
followed on with their own suit,168 netting a $290 million settlement.169

162
The Williams Act seeks to limit covert acquisitions by requiring large acquirers to disclose their
presence and intentions. See supra notes 41–45 and accompanying text.
163
See Jad Chamseddine, Allergan’s Pyott Questions Valeant, Pershing, CQ ROLL CALL (July 31,
2015), 2015 WL 4591605 (“Pershing walked away with almost $950 million in profit after the stock
price was driven up by more than 80 percent during the seven-month standoff.”).
164
See Complaint for Violations of Securities Laws, supra note 160, ¶ 19.
165
Order Granting in Part Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 29, Allergan, No. 8:14-CV-01214.
166
Allergan later dropped this lawsuit. See Joint Stipulation of Voluntary Dismissal, Allergan,
No. 8:14-CV-01214.
167
See Impact of the U.S. Tax Code on the Market for Corporate Control and Jobs: Hearing
Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’tl Affairs,
114th Cong. (2015) (testimony of David E.I. Pyott, former Chair & CEO of Allergan) (alleging that
Allergan was the victim of insider trading and urging investigation); Oversight of the SEC’s Division of
Corporation Finance, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. & Gov’t Sponsored Entities, H.
Comm. on Fin. Serv., 113th Cong. (2014) (testimony of Keith F. Higgins, Dir., Division of Corp. Fin.,
SEC) (questioning by Rep. Edward R. Royce related to the Valeant matter).
168
See Complaint for Violations of the Federal Securities Laws, Basile v. Valeant Pharm. Int’l,
Inc., No. 8:14-CV-2004 (C.D. Cal. filed Dec. 16, 2014), 2014 WL 7176420; see also Order Denying
Motion to Dismiss, Basile, No. 8:14-CV-2004, 2015 WL 7352005.
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These insider trading allegations were part of the reason that Allergan
was able to undermine the Valeant-Pershing Square bid. Ultimately, the
Allergan board approved a sale to another firm, Actavis, for $70.5
billion,170 considerably more than the $59 billion offered by Valeant.171 So
Allergan’s use of insider trading law as a defensive tactic may have
benefited the shareholders. Then again, the deal consummated more than a
year later, exposing the shareholders to substantial risk. And, as with all
defensive tactics, there is no assurance that the board is even trying to
maximize sale price rather than protect themselves.
After Allergan’s example, the strategic use of insider trading law to
disrupt activist campaigns is now presented as a standard practice.172
Allergan did not seed Pershing Square with secrets in order to block
their efforts, and so this is not in itself a case of insider tainting. However,
the drama could have unfolded in a very similar way had Allergan in fact
been the source of the tainting information. Allergan could have
communicated to Pershing Square that a tender offer would soon be
launched by Actavis. That communication would have triggered Rule 14e3, rendering subsequent purchases by Pershing Square illegal.
The scope of Rule 14e-3 is potent. It does not require that the
disclosure be in breach of a duty or misappropriated, so Pershing Square
cannot avoid this risk simply by disclaiming any confidentiality.173 If the
issuer (or bidder) tells you about a pending offer, you cannot trade, period.
The consequences of tender offer information are thus much harder to
escape (which makes it a much more potent tool for manager insider
tainting) than run-of-the-mill material, nonpublic information.174
169
Anthony Noto, Judge Approves Settlement Between Allergan Shareholders and Ackman, N.Y.
BUS. J. (Jan. 17, 2018,) https://www.bizjournals.com/newyork/news/2018/01/17/judge-approvessettlement-between-allergan-and.html [https://perma.cc/6PGS-6XM2].
170
See Actavis Completes Allergan Acquisition, PR NEWSWIRE (Mar. 17, 2015),
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/actavis-completes-allergan-acquisition-300051633.html
[https://perma.cc/Z4E2-P8P5].
171
See Stuart Pfeifer, Valeant Says It’s Willing to Raise Offer for Allergan to $200 a Share, L.A.
TIMES (Oct. 27, 2014, 5:10 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-valeant-allergan-20141028story.html [https://perma.cc/9SCB-363E].
172
See, e.g., 3 RANDY RINICELLA ET AL., SUCCESSFUL PARTNERING BETWEEN INSIDE AND
OUTSIDE COUNSEL § 46B:33 (Supp. May 2017) (“Insider trading rules may provide another litigation
avenue [in responding to activist campaigns].”); see also ARTHUR FLEISCHER, JR. ET AL., TAKEOVER
DEFENSE: MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS § 1.03 n.43 (8th ed. 2018) (discussing the Allergan matter).
173
See supra Section III.A.2.
174
Recall again Mark Cuban’s run-in with the SEC, described supra text accompanying notes 1–
10. Conceivably, the CEO of Mamma.com sought to taint Mark Cuban with inside information so that
Cuban could not sell his shares. The SEC’s case depended on testimony that Cuban had agreed to keep
the conversation confidential. The case failed in part because Cuban denied the promise of
confidentiality and the jury believed him. See Bondi, supra note 8. A similar case in the UK held
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The only way that Pershing Square could avoid this risk is to cease
communications with Allergan, but that is a highly unrealistic means of
self-preservation. Activist investors like Pershing Square make their living
by engaging in dialogue with management, applying pressure and seeking
to introduce changes to corporate policy.
2. Tainting by Bidders
Apart from the takeover context, insider tainting is also viable in the
competitive bidding context. That strategic application was central to a
recent decision by the Japanese regulators overseeing the world’s second
largest pool of securities trading.175 The Financial Services Agency of Japan
appointed a Working Group on Insider Trading Regulations to reflect on
several problems with the law that had become evident in the first decade
of the twenty-first century. One of those problems was insider tainting.
The minutes from the Working Group include several different
Working Group members expressing concern about intentional tainting.176
The FSA official in charge reported that that “law firms often inform FSA
that these problems of intentional tainting actually happen” and that this
problem of intentional tainting “has practically been pointed out for a long
time.”177 Yasuhisa Abe, a director of the Japan Business Federation, stated
that “this matter has long been pointed out, and [the Federation] has
demanded the improvement.”178 The December 24, 2012, final report
acknowledged this problem in the tender offer context:
Under insider trading regulation pertaining to TOB [Tender Offer Bid]
Insiders, a recipient of unpublished Tender Offer Facts, in principle, cannot
purchase shares of the offeree company until the offeror publishes the Tender
Offer Facts. It has been pointed out that therefore, for instance, if a person,
who has decided to buy out a listed company, discloses unpublished Tender
together because disclaiming confidentiality is ineffective even outside of the tender offer context. See
Peter J. Henning, Einhorn Case Highlights Britain’s Broader Definition of Insider Trading, N.Y.
TIMES: DEALBOOK (Jan. 31, 2012, 3:24 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/01/31/einhorn-casehighlights-britains-broader-definition-of-insider-trading [https://perma.cc/B5KN-FXM2] (comparing
the Einhorn and Cuban cases).
175
After U.S.-based exchanges, Japan is home to the world’s second largest securities trading
market. See Top 10 Stock Exchanges in the World, WORLD STOCK EXCHANGES, http://www.worldstock-exchanges.net/top10.html [https://perma.cc/BMU3-YF8V].
176
E-mail from Kevin Goldstein, Assoc., Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP, to Andrew Verstein,
Assoc. Professor of Law, Wake Forest Univ. Sch. of Law (Oct. 19, 2015, 7:46 PM) (on file with author)
(forwarding correspondence from Yoshinori Tatsuno, Assoc., Mori Hamada & Matsumoto, concerning
Fin. Servs. Agency (Japan), Ministerial Conference “Working Group on Insider Trading Regulations”
(Part 5) Minutes (Nov. 27, 2012), http://www.fsa.go.jp/singi/singi_kinyu/insider_h24/gijiroku/
20121127.html [https://perma.cc/834K-YNXG]).
177
Id.
178
Id. However, no specific incidents were discussed.
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Offer Facts to other potential acquirers, this would prevent them from
increasing their stake.179

As a result of this widely perceived problem, the Working Group
urged a change in the law, at least in regards to tender offers, to allow
trading after an appropriate period of time passes:
From the perspective of promoting fair competition with respect to mergers
and acquisitions and facilitating an orderly securities trading, it would be
appropriate for the recipients of unpublished Tender Offer Facts [to] be
allowed to purchase shares of the offeree company where investor confidence
in the securities markets would not be harmed.180

Those recommendations subsequently became law.181 Legal
commentators concurred that the main focus of this law was to address
intentional tainting of bidding competitors.182
Although written without specific reference to “tainting,” the focus of
the new safe harbor has not eluded its audience. One major international
law firm summarized the provision with explicit reference to tainting.
In consideration of the fact that a Tender Offeror could intentionally “taint”
competitors through the disclosure of its intention to engage in a tender offer
bid, the Working Group recommended that limitations be enacted on those
parties that became aware of non-public information of a tender offer bid if
such transaction would not impede fairness and undermine sound operation of
the securities market.183

179
FIN. SERVS. AGENCY OF JAPAN, THE REVIEW OF INSIDER TRADING REGULATION FOLLOWING
RECENT VIOLATIONS AND OTHER DEVELOPMENTS 11–12 (2012), http://www.fsa.go.jp/en/refer/
councils/singie_kinyu/20121225/02.pdf [https://perma.cc/7GL9-NWFN].
180
Id. at 12.
181
See Financial Instruments and Exchange Act [FIEA], Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 167, translated
in Laws, Guidelines, etc., FIN. SERVS. AGENCY, http://www.fsa.go.jp/common/law/fie01.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KX5S-8U3G] (Japan). The Diet passed the amendment on June 19, 2013. See
ATSUSHI YAMASHITA ET AL., LEGAL INSIGHT: AMENDMENTS TO JAPANESE INSIDER TRADING
REGULATIONS WHICH BROADEN THE SCOPE OF APPLICATION TO TIPPERS AND TENDER OFFER BIDS 1
(2013),
http://www.klgates.com/files/Publication/a25ec1bd-267d-484b-a12d-4c0c201095e7/
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/de028501-617b-4266-a7fe-7353128aeaf2/Alert%20%20Amendments%20to%20Japanese%20Insider%20Trading%20(FINAL)_July%202013.pdf
[https://perma.cc/99LC-5E4T]. The provisions became effective on April 1, 2014. See FIN. SERVS. &
TRANSACTIONS GRP., ANDERSON MŌRI & TOMOTSUNE, AMENDMENTS TO THE REGULATION ON
INSIDER
TRADING
(2014),
https://www.amt-law.com/pdf/bulletins2_pdf/140327.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RZ7G-V9G9].
182
E.g., WORKING GROUP RECOMMENDATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE INSIDER TRADING
REGULATIONS OF JAPAN 2 (2013), http://www.whitecase.com/alerts-03142013-1/#.VCxQzSldWRM
[https://perma.cc/DZQ2-TN3B].
183
Id.
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The Working Group did not quantify the extent of tainting, nor did it
cite specific instances nor attempt an international comparison. So it
provides only suggestive evidence that insider tainting occurs. Still, this
expert body’s conviction that a new safe harbor to combat insider tainting
was necessary, and the regulators’ decision to adjust the law in
concurrence, help to dispel any concern that insider tainting might be too
speculative. Although Japanese insider trading law differs in some respects
from American law, the comparison is still instructive because both bodies
of law are similar enough to suffer from similar pathologies.184
3. Tainting by Wolves
The forgoing discussion has implicitly addressed manager and
competitor tainting, but insider tainting can also be used to coordinate
cooperation.185 By constraining unilateral trading options, insider tainting
can reduce defection from cooperatively rational joint bidding strategies.
Consider again Murakami, the swashbuckling Japanese investor who
betrayed his activist ally, Takafumi Horie. Because Murakami sold his
shares (to Horie, it would be discovered) while he was aware of Horie’s
planned tender offer, Murakami violated Japan’s equivalent to 14e-3.186 He
was charged in 2006 and soon convicted of insider trading. His fund was
fined ¥1.149 billion, worth about 10 million USD.187 Murakami was
personally sentenced to two years of hard labor. The lesson is clear: once
you start down a road that ends in a tender offer, you must walk all the way
together or else end up in trouble.
What may not be clear is why loyalty could have (presumably)
protected Murakami from liability. After all, even if he bought shares as
planned, Murakami would still have been buying while in possession of
tender offer information. Absent an exemption, he would still be guilty of
unlawful insider trading.188 Given this expansiveness, how do rules like
14e-3 allow any coordination rather than outlaw it?
184
Japanese insider trading law is generally more restrictive of insiders and more tolerant of
tippees. This suggests that some forms of tainting will be easier than others in Japan than in America,
but that it will not be systematically out of line with U.S. experience.
185
Although cooperative from an ex ante perspective, cooperative tainting remains a strategic use
of insider trading law and one that may be strenuously resisted by its ex post victim whose preferred
plans are curtailed.
186
See FIEA (Japan), art. 167(5).
187
See Givens, supra note 60, at 1594–99.
188
Specifically, it would seem that Murakami would be guilty of warehousing, which is tipping off
allied purchasers to help stack the stockholder roles with sympathetic investors. See Chiarella v. United
States, 445 U.S. 222, 234 (1980) (noting that the SEC promulgated Rule 14e-3 to prevent warehousing);
LANGEVOORT, supra note 121, § 7:4 (“[T]he practice of ‘warehousing’—which occurs when the bidder
tips other persons about the bid and encourages them to purchase target company shares in an effort to

766

112:725 (2018)

Insider Tainting

The answer emerges from Rule 14e-3’s exemptions. Despite its reach,
Rule 14e-3 is not unlimited. Some people get to trade while they are aware
of the tender offer. At a minimum, the tender offeror herself must be
permitted to trade.189 Rule 14e-3 recognizes an exemption for offerors, and
courts have interpreted the offeror exemption to cover both offering
persons and co-offering persons.190 And the contours of this judicially
created exception are almost perfectly suited to tamp down on wolf pack
defections.191
Insider trading law creates a narrow path of safety through a perilous
realm and thus channels investors to remain on the path. To see the
exemption’s power as a commitment device, look to who precisely gets the
co-offering person exemption. The Valeant court crafted a “fact-specific,
case-by-case inquiry”192 by melding together an eight-factor test used by the
SEC in a closely related context alongside four additional factors
appropriate for this particular legal context.193
get them into friendly hands—is unlawful under [Rule 14e-3].”). A court evaluating the Pershing
Square-Valeant bid for Allergan actually granted a partial injunction against Pershing Square voting
any shares, on the theory that there were “serious questions” about whether Pershing Square was
entitled an offering person’s exemption or instead was simply warehousing shares for the real offering
person, Valeant. See Order Granting in Part Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 165, at 16–
20.
189
The SEC actually wished to ban trading by the bidder herself but relented on this point.
Compare Tender Offers, Securities Act Release No. 6,022, Exchange Act Release No. 15,548,
Investment Company Act Release No. 10,575, 44 Fed. Reg. 9,956, 9,978 (proposed Feb. 15, 1979)
(“Under [proposed Rule 14e-2], the purchase of subject company securities by a bidder which has
determined to make a tender offer but has not publicly announced its intention to do so would be
proscribed . . . .”), with Tender Offers, Securities Act Release No. 6,158, Exchange Act Release No.
16,384, 44 Fed. Reg. 70,326, 70,338 (proposed Dec. 6, 1979) (noting that, in response to commentators’
objections, “the Commission has determined not to adopt the proposal at this time,” although the SEC
“continues to be concerned by purchases by bidders after the determination to make a tender offer has
been made”).
190
E.g., Order Granting in Part Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 165, at *14 (“[T]he
Court concludes from its review of the relevant statutory and regulatory text that the term ‘offering
person’ can include multiple persons.”).
191
Coffee and Palia would actually push the law more fully in that direction. They propose
a bright-line rule: a hedge fund or other investor should not be deemed a “co-offering person”
(and thus exempt from insider trading rules), unless it joins fully in making the tender offer and
has joint and several liability for its payment. This would preclude most hedge funds from making
a modest contribution to the strategic bidder in return for advance knowledge of the bid—a tactic
that is hard to distinguish from paying a bribe for a tip.
Coffee & Palia, supra note 47, at 600. Under Coffee and Palia’s “full commitment” standard, even
minor defections from the wolf pack plan would expose the defector to criminal sanctions.
192
Order Granting in Part Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 165, at 17.
193
See id. at 12, 20. Factors one through eight were drawn from the SEC’s test for who must be
disclosed as a “bidder” for purposes of Regulation 14D. See id. (quoting from Excerpt from Current
Issues and Rulemaking Projects Outline, U.S. SEC (published Nov. 14, 2000; updated Feb. 8, 2007),
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/ci111400ex_tor.htm [https://perma.cc/969L-QQYS]).
Factors nine through ten are among those added as additional factors to narrow the application of this
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These ten factors are relevant to determining whether a person is a cooffering person:
(1)
The person’s “role in initiating, structuring, and
negotiating the tender offer”;
(2)
Whether the person is “acting together with the named
bidder”;
(3)
The person’s “control [over] the terms of the offer”;
(4)
Whether person is “providing financing for the tender
offer, or playing a primary role in obtaining financing”;
(5)
Their “control [over] the named bidder”;
(6)
Whether “the person form[ed] the nominal bidder, or
cause[d] it to be formed”;
(7)
Whether “the person beneficially own[s] the securities
purchased by the named bidder in the tender offer or the
assets of the target company”;
(8)
The “extent to which the other party benefits from the
transaction”;
(9)
Their “control over the surviving entity”;
(10)
Their “identity with the named bidder.”194
Notice that most of these factors hinge on extended cooperation with the
other members of the activist group, and all of them may be proven in part
through the testimony of the other members of the activist group. By tying
the exemption to the cooperation and testimony of the activist group, courts
have fashioned a test that encourages members of the group to hang
together.
Consider the forms of defection discussed previously. An investor
who promises to buy shares with the group but instead sells them will not
be invited to control the subsequent tender offer or control its terms, and
she can be excluded from any joint venture acquisition vehicle. Lacking
shares at the time of the tender offer, she will not benefit from its effects.
With these elements missing, the investor will likely not be considered a

test to fewer persons. See id. at 19–20. The court accepted the plaintiff’s argument that the Regulation
14D bidder inquiry is meant to be cast widely to facilitate disclosure, whereas the Rule 14e-3 exception
for co-offering persons ought to be narrow to prevent too much informed trading. Id. (justifying the
narrower test as “consistent with Rule 14-3’s purpose of limiting the universe of persons permitted to
trade on inside information only to the person making the tender offer”). The other additional factors
suggested by the plaintiff largely overlapped with those already enumerated by the SEC.
194
Id. at 17, 20.
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co-offering person and any bids in advance of the offer will violate
Rule 14e-3.195
When Allergan accused Pershing Square of illegally trading with
knowledge of Valeant’s tender offer, Pershing Square indeed argued that it
should escape liability as a co-offering person.196 The court found that there
were “serious questions” about whether Pershing Square was indeed a coissuing person because it lacked control over the offer price and did not
retain any interest in the surviving entity.197 If Pershing Square wanted to
join in the tender offer gains, it could only do it by keeping a robust control
and economic stake. Thus, even if investors see grounds for selfenrichment, the threat of insider trading liability gives them a reason to
resolve their differences and pursue their common project.
In addition to these objective indicia, evidentiary factors are also
important. If the difference between warehousing and co-offering seems
vague, that only bolsters the power of tainting to support commitment. The
testimony of the putative co-offering person or persons could prove helpful
in distinguishing pernicious warehousing from virtuous co-offering. One
gets less useful testimony from those who bear grudges. For both
evidentiary and legal reasons, one’s co-offering partner has a partial veto
over one’s trading options.
*

*

*

Insider tainting is viable and credible. It can be used by managers to
covertly block takeovers, stifling the market for corporate control. Insider
tainting lets managers circumvent antitakeover jurisprudence. The result is
that corporate assets may remain under the control of ineffective managers,
and shareholders lose out on potentially lucrative buyouts.
Shareholders likewise lose when acquirers face no competition.
Insider tainting lets bidders knock out their competition and potentially buy
a company for a song. They effectively circumvent federal laws meant to
render the tender offer process fair, competitive, and noncoercive.
Likewise, the use of tainting by wolf packs allows these activist
groups to work in concert while circumventing the Williams Act’s
regulation of concerted activism. We can be agnostic about whether the rise
of wolf packs is good or bad and yet still be skeptical of this element of
195
An investor who sets off on her own activist campaign might still benefit from the primary
group’s tender offer but no more than any other shareholder. Regardless, it is hard to imagine a coofferor exemption applying to a competitor.
196
See Order Granting in Part Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 165, at 20.
197
Id. at 22.
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their arsenal. If the law would impose disclosure and other obligations on
hedge funds coordinated through contract, it is a peculiar arbitrage to
suspend those obligations when the coordinating law is instead insider
trading law.
Whether or not insider tainting is always bad is an interesting
question.198 For now, we proceed on the assumption that insider tainting is
generally a problematic phenomenon. If that is so, it is worth asking how
we can prevent it and what it signifies about U.S. insider trading laws in
general. It is to those questions that the final Part looks.
IV. CONSIDERING INSIDER TAINTING
We have seen that insider tainting is viable and credible. If we wish to
control it, we must reduce its credibility, reduce its viability, or both. That
is, we must either catch and punish those who engage in insider tainting or
we must protect those who are victimized by insider tainting, or both.
There are indeed some steps we might consider in both of those veins.
However, both tasks are more difficult than they may appear. Section A
discusses possible modifications to the securities enforcement regime,
highlighting both what might help and what is fraught with difficulty.
This discussion of solutions sets the stage for reflection on the deeper
significance of insider tainting. It is a very strange thing that insider trading
law can be misused in this way and that this misuse is difficult to prevent.
Ultimately, insider tainting is a window into the telos and praxis of
information regulation. Section B undertakes these discussions.
A. Enforcement
Can insider tainting be controlled through appropriate exercise of the
government’s prosecutorial and enforcement powers? Subsection 1
describes the potential for preventing tainting through aggressive policing
of its perpetrators. Subsection 2 explores the role of lenience for tainting’s
victims.
1. Punishing Perpetrators
It is difficult to prosecute tainters because much tainting is arguably
legal under U.S. securities laws.199 For example, successful tainting cannot
be prosecuted under Rule 10b-5 because that rule requires a purchase or
198
For instance, if state and federal M&A law ever leads to inefficient results, then using insider
tainting to circumvent the law could lead to more efficient results. If that occurs often, and if the
circumvented law cannot be changed to accommodate these cases, then insider tainting could even be
overall efficient.
199
See supra Section III.B.
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sale, and successful tainting results in no purchase or sale. Congress could
create an ad hoc offense targeting tainting, regardless of whether there is a
purchase or sale.200 The ad hoc prohibition here could be akin to Regulation
FD but cover a wider variety of defendants and apply in a wider variety of
cases. Regulation FD itself could likewise be adjusted to more completely
prohibit tainting conduct. Finally, prosecutors and the SEC could simply
resolve to catch perpetrators of insider tainting.
Securities law interventions could be supported by corporate law.
Managers who disclose corporate secrets for inappropriate purposes violate
the duty of loyalty,201 and states have long offered their own insider trading
restrictions based on fiduciary theories.202 When tippers undermine
corporate interests in order to protect their jobs, they should be liable under
state corporate law.203
The more interesting question concerns manager tainting efforts that
are plausibly beneficial to the corporation. Like all takeover defenses, they
might be useful in blocking a foolhardy or myopic acquirer or in buying
time to drum up other bids. One might think that some uses of insider
200
Congress did as much in prohibiting spoofing, which entails the placing of trading orders with
the intent to cancel them prior to execution. See 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(5)(C) (2012). Effective spoofing may
therefore involve no purchase or sale. See generally John I. Sanders, Comment, Spoofing: A Proposal
for Normalizing Divergent Securities and Commodities Futures Regimes, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
517, 518–19 (2016).
201
See Penn Mart Realty Co. v. Becker, 298 A.2d 349, 351 (Del. Ch. 1972) (“Fraud and selfdealing are not the only ways in which corporate directors may breach their fiduciary duty; they may
also breach that duty by being grossly negligent or by wasting corporate assets.”).
202
See, e.g., Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co., 70 A.2d 5, 8 (Del. Ch. 1949) (allowing a complaint that
alleged that a corporate insider violated his duty of loyalty by trading in the company’s securities on the
basis of nonpublic information); see also In re Primedia, Inc. Shareholders Litig., 67 A.3d 455 (Del. Ch.
2013) (declining to dismiss a class action complaint to block a merger on the grounds that the Primedia
directors did not get any value for a pending Brophy claim). For discussion of cases both allowing and
rejecting state law claims by the issuer against insider trading defendants, see WANG & STEINBERG,
supra note 79, § 15.03[2].
203
One core rationale for insider trading regulation is the limitation of agency problems. See James
D. Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting: A Critical Response to the “Chicago School,” 1986 DUKE
L.J. 628, 643, 648 (arguing that insider trading might distract executives, or lead to manipulation and
leaks); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the
Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 332 (arguing that insider trading may lead to
excess volatility); Saul Levmore, Securities and Secrets: Insider Trading and the Law of Contracts,
68 VA. L. REV. 117, 149 (1982) (“[T]he temptation of profit might actually encourage an insider to act
against the corporation’s interest.”). But see Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of
Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857, 874–76 (1983) (arguing that risk-averse managers need such
incentives and their team dynamics limit how far things can go without a leak); Jesse M. Fried, Insider
Signaling and Insider Trading with Repurchase Tender Offers, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 421, 425 n.18 (2000)
(“The prospect of insider trading profits can . . . encourage insiders to invest in projects that are difficult
for outsiders to assess, whether these projects are otherwise desirable or not, in order to increase the
information asymmetry between themselves and public shareholders . . . .”). It is ironic that insider
tainting has the potential to aggravate agency problems, insofar as it acts as an antitakeover strategy.
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tainting are reasonable and proportionate. However, insider tainting is not
disclosed to shareholders, who therefore cannot evaluate its
appropriateness. It is no great reach to argue that state corporate law should
incorporate a per se ban on insider tainting.204
Bidders do not owe fiduciary duties to the target company
shareholders, so state corporate law is not a useful channel by which to
restrain them. However, when bidders use insider tainting to deter or
discipline other acquirers, this tactical choice is almost certainly
appropriate for disclosure under the Williams Act. Anyone buying 5% or
more of a stock must timely file with the SEC a detailed disclosure,
including discussion of their intentions.205 It should not be controversial for
the SEC and courts to deem Schedule 13D filings incomplete if they omit
discussion of recourse to insider tainting. Similar disclosures are required,
and should cover tainting, for the execution of a tender offer.
Yet legal restrictions—whether state or federal, corporate or
securities—face information problems. Courts cannot discipline
perpetrators without information about their efforts, and perpetrators will
go to great lengths to conceal their conduct.
Further surveillance and evidentiary problems arise from the fact that
victims of insider tainting will be reluctant to come forward. The victims of
insider tainting will often be sophisticated traders and investors whose
research practices may well push the boundaries of the law. To report
tainting to the SEC, victims would necessarily admit to possessing
material, nonpublic information and invite careful consideration of their
practices. Victims’ reluctance to expose themselves to scrutiny by reporting
a crime replicates in a white-collar context a phenomenon familiar to
scholars of street crime and immigration law: in order to actually enforce
the law in marginalized communities, law enforcement officials must
assure victims that they are safe to report and cooperate.206
204
The fact that some of the simplest and most important fixes are obtained from corporate law
underscores the importance of transsubstantive analyses. See generally James J. Park, Reassessing the
Distinction Between Corporate and Securities Law, 64 UCLA L. REV. 116 (2017) (rejecting some
distinctions between securities and corporate law, but embracing others).
205
See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
206
See NIK THEODORE, INSECURE COMMUNITIES: LATINO PERCEPTIONS OF POLICE INVOLVEMENT
IN
IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT
1
(2013),
http://www.policylink.org/sites/default/files/
INSECURE_COMMUNITIES_REPORT_FINAL.PDF [https://perma.cc/9DBX-JHE4] (stating that
44% of Latinos and 70% of undocumented immigrants report that they are less likely to contact law
enforcement authorities if they are victims of crime); Lou Furman & Alison R McCrary, Building Trust
in Law Enforcement: Community-Police Mediation in New Orleans, 63 LA. B.J. 192, 194 (2015)
(noting that civilians who attended a community–police mediation program designed to build trust
reported an increased likelihood to report incidents to the police); Tracey L. Meares, The Path
Forward: Improving the Dynamics of Community–Police Relationships to Achieve Effective Law
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This leads naturally to the question of how to assure the victims of
insider tainting that they will not be punished for what they report or the
attention that it brings to them. We turn to that question now.
2. Protecting Victims
Prosecutors can attempt to allay the fears of the victims of insider
tainting (that they might be prosecuted if they report their involvement with
the tipper) by trying not to prosecute victims of insider tainting. But this
policy will give little comfort to some tainted individuals; an individual
prosecutor may not believe the victim that the tipping was unwanted. Even
if all regulators exercised appropriate restraint, private plaintiffs would not.
Insider trading gives rise to private actions under Rule 10b-5.207
Entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ lawyers are unlikely to restrain themselves if
given the chance to pursue disgorgement.
We could institutionalize lenience toward victims of tainting in order
to make lenience credible and predictable.208 Japan did as much, adopting a
safe harbor for victims of tainting in the tender offer context.209 The
amended law gives tainted traders two ways to overcome the taint. First,
they may disclose both the content of the tip as well as how they came to
learn it.

Enforcement Policies, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1355, 1359-60 (2017) (explaining low cooperation in terms
of perceptions that police are not procedurally fair). But see Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles,
Legitimacy and Cooperation: Will Immigrants Cooperate with Local Police Who Enforce Federal
Immigration Law? 48–49 (Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 734 (2d Series),
2015),
http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2438&context=law_and_economics
[https://perma.cc/9H2U-JJUS] (questioning the assumption that deputizing police to enforce
immigration laws via the Secured Communities program undermined immigrant communities’ trust in
law enforcement).
207
For discussion of Rule 10b-5 private actions against insider trading defendants, see generally
WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 79, §§ 6.01–13.
208
We could expand this exemption to cover private suits as well.
209
Japan has a law similar to SEC Rule 14e-3, which prohibits trading while in possession of
information about a pending tender offer. See Financial Instruments and Exchange Act [FIEA], Law
No. 25 of 1948, art. 167, translated in Laws, Guidelines, etc., FIN. SERVS. AGENCY,
http://www.fsa.go.jp/common/law/fie01.pdf [https://perma.cc/KX5S-8U3G] (Japan). The law provided
that “[u]nder insider trading regulation . . . a recipient of unpublished Tender Offer Facts, in principle,
cannot purchase shares of the offeree company until the offeror publishes the Tender Offer Facts.”
WORKING GROUP RECOMMENDATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE INSIDER TRADING REGULATIONS OF
JAPAN, supra note 182, at 11. The enacted statute used the phrase “Fact Concerning Launch of a Tender
Offer” in lieu of the Working Group’s “Tender Offer Facts.” See FIEA (Japan), art. 167(2) (defining
“Facts Concerning Launch of a Tender Offer”). A Working Group appointed by the Japanese securities
regulator was concerned that these restrictions would inhibit the takeover market. In June of 2013, the
law was amended in a variety of ways to implement the proposals put forth by the Working Group.
Among them were provisions added to address the possibility of insider tainting. The amended law
gives tainted traders two ways to overcome the taint. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.

773

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

Second, and more interestingly, they may wait six months.210 After
that period, the trader may begin to trade again—though it seems that the
tainted trader remains barred from making her own tender offers.211 The
notion is that after six months, any inside information is likely to have lost
its value. Consistent with the Japanese approach of listing certain types of
information as per se material, we might say that this safe harbor deems
certain stale information as per se immaterial.
The SEC could adopt such a safe harbor as a partial solution. A trader
who received any information—tender offer or otherwise—would be
eligible to trade again after an appropriate period of time.
Yet such an approach is both under- and overinclusive. It is
overinclusive in that it would supply a defense to traders who were not
tainted. Dyed-in-the-wool insider traders would calibrate their conduct and
litigation defenses to match any available safe harbor, fabricating earlierin-time origin stories for any information obtained.
It is underinclusive in that many victims of tainting will find a long
delay interminable. Many reasons to buy or sell—an urgent need for
liquidity, a sense that the stock is temporarily mispriced, the realization by
many firms at the same time that acquiring a given supplier will give the
acquirer a strategic edge—must be acted upon soon or not at all. This is
particularly true in the case of competitive bidding. A target company is
likely to be off the market six months after the auction would have begun.
Another form of systematic protection for victims would be to alter
the knowledge or causation standard now used in insider trading law.212
Recall that one reason that tainting is possible is that victims cannot simply
set aside the information tipped. Once tipped, they are aware of the
proscribed information, that is, they are in knowing possession. Under the
SEC’s “awareness” standard, the proscribed information need not actually
cause any change in trading conduct; so information “set aside” is still
sufficient to create liability. Under a “use” standard, traders would not be
liable for trading upon receipt of a tip if—as many victims will—they had
ample reason to trade and would have done so anyway. Given the amount
of debate surrounding this standard, it is natural to ask whether insider
tainting offers a reason to reconsider the law’s causation standard.213
210

See FIEA (Japan), art. 167(5)(viii)–(ix).
See id.
212
See supra Section II.A.
213
Some of the arguments for a “use” standard include: (1) It gives proper attention to the
importance of scienter, whereas a “possession” standard allows conviction of a defendant with no
fraudulent or deceptive intent. See United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1067–68 (9th Cir. 1998)
(discussing the benefit of a scienter requirement under a “use” standard); see also SEC v. Adler,
211
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The most reasonable conclusion may not be a wholesale change of the
causation standard but a targeted change for tainted traders. Where there
are credible allegations of insider tainting, the facts will often support some
inference that the defendant was going to trade anyway, and this could be
an effective affirmative defense. 214
The main rationales in favor of a “possession” standard include easing
the practical burden imposed by a “use” standard,215 references to statutory
text,216 conformity with prior decisions,217 and consistency with the classical
theory of insider trading.218 Most interestingly, Professor Fried argues that a
137 F.3d 1325, 1338 (11th Cir. 1998) (stating that “we do not believe that the SEC’s knowing
possession test would always and inevitably be limited to situations involving fraud”). For scholars
raising similar criticisms, see, for example, Stuart Sinai, A Challenge to the Validity of Rule 10b5-1,
30 SEC. REG. L.J. 261, 264–67, 271, 282 (2002); Swanson, supra note 122, at 196–99, 204 (criticizing
the lack of scienter and suggesting that the SEC may have exceeded its authority in promulgating such a
rule); Kevin E. Warner, Rethinking Trades “on the Basis of” Inside Information: Some Interpretations
of SEC Rule 10b5-1, 83 B.U. L. REV. 281, 305–14 (2003) (arguing that courts should read a scienter
requirement into Rule 10b-5). (2) By relieving prosecutors of the question of whether the trade was
motivated in part by proscribed information—whether or not the defendant is allowed an affirmative
defense—an awareness standard shifts significant burdens of proof onto the defendant, which is
unacceptable in a criminal action and undesirable in a civil action. See Smith, 155 F.3d at 1069 (noting
that because the case is a criminal prosecution, the court is “therefore not at liberty . . . to establish an
evidentiary presumption that gives rise to an inference of use”).
214
Under Adler, such an affirmative defense is already possible. See Adler, 137 F.3d at 1337
(noting that trading while in possession of information gives rise to a “strong inference” that such
information was used, but that the defendant can “rebut the inference by adducing evidence that there
was no causal connection between the information and the trade”). Likewise, Rule 10b5-1(c) recognizes
its own affirmative defense. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(c) (2017). However, the formalities for that
rule make it unworkable in a variety of tainting contexts. It operates if the trader has already entered
into a binding contract to trade, instructed someone to execute their trade, or adopted a written trading
plan. See id. § 240.10b5-1(c)(A). The plan must specify the terms of a series of transactions to come
and allow the trader no discretion to vary it. See id. § 240.10b5-1(c)(B). Such an affirmative defense is
fine for executives who wish to buy or sell corporate stock at regular intervals, but it is plainly too
restrictive for any of the M&A contexts described in this article.
215
See United States v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112, 120–21 (2d Cir. 1993) (discussing the simplicity of
the “knowing possession” standard).
216
E.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-1, 78t-1 (2012) (both referring to “any person” who violates or has
violated “any provision of this chapter or the rules or regulation thereunder by purchasing or selling a
security while in possession of material, nonpublic information”). Compare LANGEVOORT, supra note
121, § 3.13 (arguing that this language is “an endorsement of the broader [“possession”] test for insider
trading liability”), with WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 79, § 4.04[5] (arguing that “[c]hoice of the
phrase ‘while in possession of’ could be either an endorsement of the broader standard or a refusal to
choose between the two standards”).
217
See Teicher, 987 F.2d at 120–21 (noting that the “possession” standard is consistent with the
“disclose or abstain” rule (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 (1980))); see also In re
Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 34-6668, 1961 WL 60638 (Nov. 8, 1961)
(establishing the “disclose or abstain” rule).
218
See Donna M. Nagy, The “Possession vs. Use” Debate in the Context of Securities Trading by
Traditional Insiders: Why Silence Can Never Be Golden, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1129, 1135 (1999)
(justifying the “possession” standard on the grounds of fairness).
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“possession” standard is a logical fit with a regime that allows insiders to
profitably abstain and cannot prevent them from doing so.219 Insiders are
indeed hemmed in by a “possession” standard, blocked from trades they
would otherwise make, but their losses from these trades approximately
offset the relative gains they make from “insider abstentions.”220 That is,
insiders can lawfully cancel trades in light of material, nonpublic
information, averting losses. If we accept that insider abstentions are
inevitable, but we do not want insiders to make above-market returns based
on their knowledge, then a possession rule makes sense.
While accepting Professor Fried’s claims in general, we can say with
confidence that it applies with less strength in the context of, and therefore
in the shadow of, insider tainting. Fried’s point is that insiders already get a
perk by virtue of their role—by learning about information adverse to their
current trading plans, insiders can always abstain from trading and avoid
the loss befalling the less informed masses. Our law does not seek to stop
this behavior, nor could it easily do so. But the tax imposed by way of a
“knowing possession” standard precisely offsets this perk. Traders who
intended to trade will be unable to do so because of confirmatory but
proscribed information. Fried shows that the expected value of abstention
opportunities gained should approximately match the expected cost of
trading opportunities lost because news is just as likely to contradict one’s
trading plans as to bolster them.221
Such an outcome is not assured when strategic actors disseminate
information to suit their own plans. A mogul in the business of buying
operating companies for her conglomerate is not going to receive a
representative sample of information, some reinforcing her buying plans
and some reinforcing her plans to abstain from buying certain stocks.
Strategic tippers will only bother to give information intended to frustrate
likely plans to buy or sell. Hostile buyers will be tipped of other pending
tender offers relating to the target company, for example, not about other
companies they never planned to buy. Unlike the executives in Fried’s
framework, law-abiding victims of tainting will be systematically
disadvantaged by the information they receive.
While recognizing a different causation standard for tainting than the
rest of insider trading might appear ad hoc and complex, it is not
unimaginable that the different economics of insider tainting warrant a
subtly different rule. Professor Donna Nagy has argued that the standard—

219
220
221
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possession or use—should turn on the sort of insider trading. Professor
Nagy argues that classical insiders, such as the directors of firms, owe
broad disclosure duties and may not trade without disclosing all the
material information that the shareholders might want to know; thus they
are subject to a “knowing possession” standard.222 Various other actors,
such as tippees, do not stand in a fiduciary relationship with their trading
partners and so are subject to less stringent disclosure duties.223 For them,
the appropriate standard really is the use rule. Insofar as this insider tainting
arises in all insider trading contexts except classical theory trading by
classical corporate insiders, it fits nicely with Professor Nagy’s analysis.
That is, the typical individuals inhibited by insider tainting are outsiders to
the firm, such as would-be investors. These individuals do not owe
fiduciary duties to other traders that would justify a “possession” standard.
Thus, abusive information tainting can be reduced in a way that is
consistent with the underlying logic of the main theories of insider trading.
There is a case to be made for a “use” standard in this context, but it
comes with obvious risks. Intransigent insider traders will gin up stories
about intentional tainting in order to avoid liability. It is an open question
whether it is worth the effort and cost of vetting those claims to deal with
this problem. And even victims of tainting may be making the best of it by
trading even more aggressively in light of their new information. Any safe
harbor would have to prevent (or risk) licensing such post-taint insider
trading.
The causation (use or possession) standard is not the only substantive
component of insider trading law that bears on the viability of tainting.
Another way to protect victims of tainting is to make the law turn on facts
that are objectively demonstrable at the time of the tip. If tippees can be
sure that they will not be liable for trading and if they know that it will be a
simple matter to vindicate themselves before prosecutors or compliance
departments, then they can safely ignore the tainting tip. The benefits of
bright-line assurance provide some support for a strong personal benefit
test and some reason to oppose an expansive equal access rule.
The Supreme Court in Dirks held that individuals are generally free to
share information and to trade on the information they receive. However,
trading may be proscribed when certain “objective criteria” are met, such
as when “the insider receives a direct or indirect personal benefit from the
disclosure, such as a pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that will
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See Nagy, supra note 218, at 1135.
See id.
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translate into future earnings.”224 The Second Circuit’s Newman decision,
later overruled,225 seized upon the language of “pecuniary gain” to heighten
the personal benefit test. During the brief life of Newman, conviction
required “a meaningfully close personal relationship that generates an
exchange that is objective, consequential, and represents at least a potential
gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature. In other words . . . a quid
pro quo.”226
The personal benefit requirement of Dirks and, briefly, Newman is
usually understood as a carve-out to protect discrete classes of useful
conduct. Executives may sometimes help their employers by sharing
information with analysts. Analysts improve market efficiency by cobbling
together information. A personal benefit requirement separates these useful
activities from the corrupt and inefficient sale of secrets by insiders.
Insider tainting allows us to view the personal benefit standard in a
new light. Rather than just protecting certain classes of tippers and tippees
(executives interfacing with analysists), the personal benefit test helps
protect all traders against tainting. That is because a trader can know at the
time of the tip whether she has conferred a personal benefit onto the tipper.
When there is no suggestion of a personal benefit to the tipper, the tippee
can trade with confidence.
This confidence is even greater if courts require objective indicia of
pecuniary quid pro quo to satisfy the personal benefit test. A tippee will
know immediately whether she has given cash to the tipper. In most
tainting cases, the tippee will not have paid for the tip. This fact will not
only protect her at trial but will also give her immediate assurance of
safety, demonstrable enough to calm prosecutors and compliance
departments.
This is not a perfect safe harbor. The personal benefit test may not
apply in all classical theory cases or any misappropriation cases. And after
Salman, the personal benefit test has been widened again to allow more
than objective and pecuniary benefits. Still, the personal benefit test is a
prodefendant rule that helps protect against tainting more than other
prodefendant rules. For example, a heightened burden of proof on
materiality (requiring prosecutors to establish by clear and convincing
evidence that the tip was material) would help defendants win cases, but it
224

Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 663 (1983).
United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014), overruled by Salman v. United States,
137 S. Ct. 420, 428 (2016) (overruling the requirement of pecuniary gain), United States v. Martoma,
869 F.3d 58, 67 (2d Cir. 2017) (overruling the requirement of “meaningfully close personal
relationship”); see also supra note 85.
226
Newman, 773 F.3d at 452.
225
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would not give them ex ante certainty of victory, nor would it make it easy
for them to quickly convince prosecutors and compliance departments to
leave them alone. This difference in the timing and demonstrability of
assurance, and the resultant protection against tainting, provides some
vindication of a strong personal benefit test.
Tainting also points out an additional cost of a more restrictive insider
trading rules. In the context of tender offers, American law mostly prohibits
trading while in possession of material nonpublic information, regardless of
how one learned the information. For many, this parity of access
presumption is the ideal and would be appropriately expanded to prohibit
informed trading in all assets. Whatever the merits or demerits of such a
regime, insider tainting adds another argument against its adoption. In an
equal access regime, knowledge alone is always disabling, and so tainting
is much easier to achieve. The tipping party need not add a postscript about
the provenance of the information, nor can the information recipient protect
themselves by avoiding a personal or pecuniary relationship with the
source.
Although tainting is possible because of peculiar features of our
system (e.g., harsh punishment for lawbreakers a “use” standard for
causation), it is also tempered by other features of our law (e.g., restrictions
that turn on duty and may require a showing of a personal benefit, rather
than an equal access rule). Whether these features are ultimately justified
cannot be settled here, but it is worth noticing that there is at least a kind of
symmetry and fit with regards to the threat of insider tainting.
B. Learning from Tainting
This Section broadens the view, asking what insider tainting might
teach about the law of insider trading generally and, even more broadly, the
regulation of information in markets.
1. Competing Impulses in American Insider Trading Law
If insider trading is possible, and if it is hard to constrain, it serves to
highlight the competing natures of U.S. insider trading law. On the one
hand, the law is prodefendant. Rule 10b-5 applies only to purchases and
sales. Our law generally allows insider trading in most assets, and it blocks
insider trading in securities only when we can implicate the trader with
some kind of fraud and, usually, breach of a duty.227 This tolerant attitude
differs from the approach of other jurisdictions, which have long barred
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See supra Section II.A.
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trading in any financial asset while possessing essentially any informational
advantage.228
This prodefendant strain of insider trading law may reflect American
solicitude toward white-collar criminals, our commitment to robust capital
markets, suspicion of lawyer-driven private litigation, or the path
dependency of our common law rulemaking. It also may reflect a legacy of
toleration of insider trading. Informed trading only became the market’s
most notorious offense beginning in the early 1960s,229 and it was only
thirty years ago that the words “insider trading” appeared in a statute for
the first time.230
Yet while the substance of our law has often favored defendants,
American insider trading law remains a fearsome creature in terms of its
penalties and potential for enforcement. Dozens of traders each year are
investigated for trading on the basis of proscribed information,231 resulting
in a multitude of civil enforcement actions.232 Since 2009, more than eighty
traders have been criminally convicted by federal prosecutors in Manhattan
alone.233 The law authorizes double-digit prison terms and multimillion
dollar fines.234 The litigation process is expensive and can impose interim
harms on a defendant’s reputation and business. In addition, the harshness
of penalties and the indirect impact of an enforcement action impose a
chilling aura over conduct anywhere near the line of legality.

228
European law is not strictly more expansive. The European Union’s Market Abuse directive
instructs member states to prohibit “insider dealing,” which occurs “where a person possesses inside
information and uses that information by acquiring or disposing of, for its own account or for the
account of a third party, directly or indirectly, financial instruments to which that information relates.”
Council Regulation 596/2014, art. 8, ¶ 1, 2014 O.J. (L 173) (EU). It therefore adopts a “use” standard
for causation. See Hui Huang, The Insider Trading “Possession Versus Use” Debate: An International
Analysis, 34 SEC. REG. L.J. (2006) (comparing the relevant standards under UK, Australian, and
Canadian law).
229
See MANNE, supra note 73, at 2 (stating that insider trading did not evoke public condemnation
in the early twentieth century); see also Crimmins, supra note 72, at 349 (“From the SEC’s founding in
1934 to Chairman Cary’s groundbreaking 1961 decision in Cady, Roberts—a span of twenty-seven
years—the SEC brought no insider trading cases at all. Over the subsequent twenty years, insider
trading continued to be a relatively low prosecution priority in terms of the number of cases at the
agency . . . .”). But see Perino, supra note 73, at 51 (challenging the view that insider trading was an
accepted practice in the early twentieth century).
230
See supra note 71.
231
See supra note 67.
232
See supra note 68.
233
See supra note 69.
234
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2012) (providing for not more than $5 million in fines, 20 years
imprisonment, or both for any willful violation of the Exchange Act or any rule thereunder). See
generally WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 79, § 7.02[1].
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And it is often unclear where the line is. No statute or rule defines
“insider trading,”235 leaving defendants without the sort of notice normally
expected for potentially criminal acts.236 In most cases where the SEC has
offered guidance, it has done so in ways disadvantageous to defendants.
For example, it has instituted an awareness standard for the causal inquiry
of whether a trade was “on the basis of” material nonpublic information.237
Most other jurisdictions have rejected this approach.238 Likewise, the SEC
has defined tender offer insider trading in such a way that traders need not
even know all the elements of their alleged offense.239
Although critics have decried both American harshness and American
lenience, the equilibrium may have proven stable because it struck a
palatable balance: much is permitted, but violators are in hot water.
Yet it is this combination of hot and cold that makes insider tainting
possible. Strategic actors can position themselves in the law’s protective
eddies after leading their targets down the law’s most dangerous channels.
Numerous accommodations protect those who tip for tainting purposes: the
requirement of a purchase or sale protects successful tainting efforts, the
personal benefit requirement allows much loyal tipping, etc. With so many
safe harbors, actual and bluffing tainting efforts are credible. Yet they are
also meaningful to the victim. Insider trading law is harsh and expansive,
covering even those lacking in bad intent. Without any sort of good faith
defense, prudent tippees may wisely abstain from planned trades. The
features that make the law so effective against genuinely bad actors also
make it a dangerous threat to innocent tippees.
United States securities laws have developed in fits and spurts,
emerging from sporadic congressional action and the accretion of federal
court decisions (and the shadow of them). While it appears defensibly
workable much of the time,240 increasingly sophisticated market
participants are likely to continue to test its boundaries and kinks. At some
point, we may decide that the time has come for the hard work of agreeing
upon a unified, clear statutory scheme for this domain.
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See supra note 70.
See John P. Anderson, Solving the Paradox of Insider Trading Compliance, 88 TEMP. L. REV.
273, 282–85 (2016) (discussing the ambiguity of when information becomes public).
237
See supra Section II.A.
238
See supra note 228.
239
See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
240
See, e.g., Peter J. Henning, What’s So Bad About Insider Trader Law?, 70 BUS. LAW. 751
(2015) (generally defending the status quo).
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2. The Nature of Information
Arguably the most important development in economics in recent
decades has been a heightened focus on information.241 Three pioneers of
information economics, a field focused on strategic action under conditions
of imperfect information, were crowned with the Nobel Prize in 2001.242
Much of the literature, particularly as it comes to inform the law,
presumes that additional information is a good thing, both for the recipient
and for society in general. Scholars have praised the use of information
disclosures to protect consumers.243 Our federal securities regulation regime
is principally a regime of mandatory disclosure of information to the
public. We hope and expect that, as a result of these disclosures and other
market dynamics, securities markets will be largely efficient, with prices
reflecting all publicly available information.244
And, of course, information plays a central role in shaping the
regulation of informed trading—in both securities markets and ordinary
contract markets. We wish to encourage individuals to develop knowledge
about assets and to contribute that knowledge to the public good.245
Allowing trading profits is one way to encourage research and
dissemination.246 On the other hand, informed traders increase trading costs
and lower liquidity for all other traders, widening spreads and potentially
241

See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman of Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Speech at the
Conference Co-Sponsored by the Center for Economic Policy Studies and the Bendheim Center for
Finance (Sept. 24, 2010), 2010 WL 3726649, at *5 (“[O]ne of the most important developments in
economics over recent decades has been the flowering of information economics . . . .”). Myriad law
and economics papers apply game theoretic models of information asymmetry to predict behavior and
propose improved law in light of incentives. See, e.g., Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum,
Revelation and Suppression of Private Information in Settlement-Bargaining Models, 81 U. CHI. L.
REV. 83 (2014).
242
See The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2001,
NOBELPRIZE.ORG (2001), http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2001
[https://perma.cc/4AZV-4XEC] (describing the Nobel Prize in economics awarded to George Akerlof,
Michael Spence, and Joseph Stiglitz “for their analyses of markets with asymmetric information”
(emphasis omitted)).
243
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Informing America: Risk, Disclosure, and the First Amendment,
20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 653, 655–58 (1993) (arguing for informational remedies on the grounds of
liberty, economics, and democracy). But see OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN
YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 7–13 (2014) (criticizing the
mandated-disclosure regime on a variety of grounds).
244
See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246-47 (1988) (justifying the adoption of the fraudon-the-market presumption on the grounds that the market price of a security reflects all publicly
available information).
245
See Jack Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive
Activity, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 561, 573 (1971) (stating that public information, but not private
information, has social value).
246
See id. (“Speculative profits . . . provide the knowledgeable individual with an incentive to
disseminate (publicize) his private information.”).
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lowering the informativeness of prices.247 Both our securities law of insider
trading and our contract doctrine of mistake are attempts to balance these
two competing information paradigms.
Anthony Kronman’s seminal paper provides the simplest formula for
how the law should balance the right to informed trading against the
obligation of disclosure.248 He argued that the law should allow trading
based on information that was deliberately acquired (in order to encourage
such acquisition) but bar trading based on information that was casually
acquired, either by chance or as an inevitable consequence of their career.249
This theory helps explain, for example, why diligent analysts are permitted
to trade on the secrets they discover but corporate executives are not
permitted to take their company’s juicy secrets home for evening time
trading. It also helps validate the sentiment—not actually reflected in U.S.
law—that “a businessman who acquires a valuable piece of information
when he accidentally overhears a conversation on a bus” should not be able
to trade on that information.250 The businessman presumably does not need
any trade-based incentive to ride the bus to work. A law against trading
based on bus-acquired secrets would prevent windfalls without
discouraging productive research. After all, “it would certainly be strange if
he stopped riding buses altogether,” and so a disclosure rule appears
compatible with continued inadvertent learning.251
Kronman’s approach has been very influential,252 though subsequent
scholars have criticized Kronman’s formulation253 and problematized the
distinction between deliberately and casually acquired information by

247
See Merritt B. Fox et al., The Regulation of Informed Trading and Its Regulation, J. CORP. L.
(forthcoming 2018).
248
See Kronman, supra note 18, at 16–17.
249
See id.
250
Id. at 13.
251
Id. at 14.
252
See, e.g., United States v. Dial, 757 F.2d 163, 168 (7th Cir. 1985) (citing Kronman in analyzing
informed trades by a broker).
253
E.g., WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 79, § 2.02[2] & nn.30–32 (criticizing Kronman—among
other reasons—for presuming that unilateral mistakes are socially wasteful, and stating that his standard
is difficult to apply). Responding to these criticisms (and sometimes to their own), subsequent scholars
have provided more complex versions of Kronman’s core insight. See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg,
Disclosure in Contract Law, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1645, 1648, 1687 (2003) (developing a “multi-stranded
rule” to govern disclosure in contract law); Steven Shavell, Acquisition and Disclosure of Information
Prior to Sale, 25 RAND J. ECON. 20, 21 (1994) (“[I]f information is not socially valuable . . . a
disclosure obligation is socially desirable because it will reduce . . . the incentive to acquire
information.”).
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pointing out the ability of traders to deliberately put themselves into a
position to acquire information.254
The possibility of insider tainting goes further in problematizing the
deliberate-casual distinction by highlighting an underlying linkage
between these two paths for obtaining information: casually acquired
information is just information that was not deliberately avoided. We can
think of it as deliberately acquired information with a negative coefficient.
To return to Kronman’s example of the bus-riding businessman, a rule
barring trades while in possession of material, nonpublic information might
indeed lead some individuals to avoid the bus, at least on the days when
those individuals are about to execute a major trade. And individuals who
could not avoid the bus might well invest less in research, knowing that
they might lose the right to use it, due to background noise on their
commute.
Kronman presumably doubts that buses traffic in enough secrets for
either effect to matter, but insider tainting upsets that assumption. Within
the set of casually acquired information is information that others
endeavored to deliver. If there is an incentive to taint certain traders, tippers
may well seek out their bus route (or email address or cell phone number)
in order to frustrate their trading plans. This fact gives potential victims a
reason to invest in protective efforts, meaning that the possibility of
strategic tainting will affect investor behavior.
The possibility of insider tainting does indeed alter incentives for
potential victims. Just as individuals can deliberately situate themselves to
casually acquire information, they can deliberately situate themselves to
avoid casual acquisition. Tainting parties are most likely to wish to taint
traders with independent reasons to trade, typically with the victim’s own
private information justifying the trade. Insider tainting will therefore tend
to occur where individuals have invested in information, and it will act to
reduce the value of that information ex post. From an ex ante perspective,
potential victims will invest less in information development if they know
that the law may later force them to sit on the sidelines.
And as a trader’s preferred moment of execution occurs, the trader
gains an incentive to plug her ears. She may opt to avoid taking calls or
emails, at least from anonymous sources, lest a preplanned trade become
invalid by virtue of new, casually acquired information. Yet these self254
See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 203, at 330 (noting that investors’ skill, wealth, and human
capital differences result in different abilities to use the information they discover); Kimberly D.
Krawiec, Fairness, Efficiency, and Insider Trading: Deconstructing the Coin of the Realm in the
Information Age, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 443, 478 (2001) (pointing out that individuals might opt to become
an executive in order to acquire information).
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protective efforts further limit the flow of information. An activist hedge
fund might instruct its employees not to take calls or open email from
employees of the issuer firm. This would help to protect the firm from
tainting, but it would limit the research and engagement that makes activist
investment useful to begin with. Tuning out market information before a
trade is hardly the optimal behavior for the market’s best informed traders.
In the presence of insider trading law, casually acquired information
can harm diligently informed traders. This effect is not random. It grows as
the trader spends more resources on research because of the strategic
element of insider tainting. In light of insider tainting, insider trading law
acts as a tax on diligently acquired information. This complicates the tradeoffs involved in the regulation of information in markets, rendering our
trade-offs far more dynamic than previously assumed.
Of course, strategic tainting is just a special case of the more general
phenomenon that regulating information can affect its production and
distribution.255 Strategic tainting means that traders may fear getting a toxic
flow of information, which tends predictably to harm their trading plans.
But accidental information discovery, say under Rule 14e-3, still affects
information in surprising ways. The more information one has accumulated
already, the more one will lose if a later discovery disables one’s trades. So
any proscribed information regime acts as a friction on continued
information acquisition, decreasing the marginal return to greater research.
The magnitude of these dynamics, and how they interact with other
features of the information and trading environment, are worthy of further
study.

255
See, e.g., M. Todd Henderson et al., Offensive Disclosure: How Voluntary Disclosure
Can Increase Returns from Insider Trading, 103 GEO. L.J. 1275, 1300 (2015) (providing data to support
the hypothesis that “voluntary disclosure may shield informed trades from legal scrutiny”). Of course,
securities law is not the only area to confront strategic information sharing. Patent scholars have also
identified cases where it pays to share information because it can disrupt competitors’ patenting efforts.
See Scott Baker & Claudio Mezzetti, Disclosure as a Strategy in the Patent Race, 48 J.L. & ECON. 173,
177 (2005) (“Disclosure in essence extends the race.”); cf. Jennifer Nou & Edward H. Stiglitz, Strategic
Rulemaking Disclosure, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 751–55 (2016) (describing strategic disclosure by
agencies). See generally Gideon Parchomovsky, Publish or Perish, 98 MICH. L. REV. 926 (2000). And,
akin to the hedge fund coordination strategies discussed above, scholars have described how strategic
disclosure can be used to hold cartels together. See generally Scott Baker et al., Intellectual Property
Disclosure as “Threat” 1–2 (Univ. of Leicester, Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No. 07/08, 2007),
https://www.le.ac.uk/economics/research/RePEc/lec/leecon/dp07-8.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ZLS-TAEB]
(“We show how disclosure threats can effectively enforce explicit and tacit agreements between
firms.”).
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CONCLUSION
Many would-be traders are grateful to receive material, nonpublic
information; many tippers share information to help the tippee or to earn
their gratitude. If there were no laws banning insider trading, almost all
tipping would involve mutually consensual transfers. Indeed, our insider
trading laws are predicated on the notion that enthusiastic tipping dyads
would ignore the public interest.
Nevertheless, insider trading law may sometimes lead to more tipping
precisely because of the way that the law is structured. Rather than simply
removing informational advantages, American insider trading law pushes
informed traders to abstain altogether. That may leave the recipients worse
off than they started. Thus, informational disclosure becomes a method for
constructing legal barriers to the tippee’s action.
Tainting with inside information is a viable strategy because of the
many ways that tippers can elude responsibility for their disclosures and
because tippees are unable to protect themselves from tainting. They cannot
simply abstain from fraud or refuse to pay bribes for tips. Insider trading
law is invoked if the tippee is told the magic words that someone else
breached a duty to get this tip to them. And having heard those words, the
trader cannot just disregard the information because they will remain aware
of it. Tainting casts a cloud even in the many cases where a clear-sighted
judge would actually acquit the trader based on the facts simply because
the facts and law are not always clear. Traders may fear that prosecutors,
plaintiffs, or judges may see things differently than they are.
There are a number of fact patterns in which tippers may find insider
tainting attractive. Executives working at an issuer company might use
tainting as a strategy for deterring undesirable acquirers—whether for the
company’s benefit or for their own. Competing traders or investors might
use tainting to temporarily eliminate their competitors in an acquisition or
at a trading desk. Cooperative traders might likewise use insider trading
law to buttress their planned collective investment strategy.
Insider tainting serves as a useful vehicle to think about how much our
insider trading regime costs and how it works. It is not just that insider
trading law is vague or punishes selfish but not obviously destructive
conduct; it also serves as a weapon for strategic actors to wield against one
another.
The threat of tainting reveals an unexpected implication of our scheme
of information regulation: it can constrain innocent trading and tax the
creation of useful information. There is a strong link between deliberately
acquired and deliberately avoided information. Insider trading law does not
just discourage casual or corrupt information gathering; it sometimes
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encourages deliberate information avoidance. Surprisingly, the law’s
injunction to do no evil seemingly entails a subsidiary injunction: hear no
evil.
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